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The impressive increase of Norwegian national wealth since the 1970s is mainly attributable to 
endowment in natural resource and the well-working of institutions. This work highlights how 
in addition of the traditional man-made capital, human capital, and natural capital, the 
Norwegian model, relies greatly on a particular type capital that is not explicitly enough 
mentioned in economics, namely the “institutional capital”.  The “institutional capital” can 
without hesitation be included among the inputs used to create value in Norway because the 
Norwegian institutions do not just constitute a resource but also are the source of its economic 
solidity. The great role played by the institution has resulted in an enormous fortune kept in a 
sovereign fund (the Government Pension Fund). This work second finding is that the increase 
of the national wealth does not guarantee the end of economic problems; the origin of the wealth 
conditions considerably the way it has to be allocated to the population. The case of the 
Norwegian oil-rent allocation has been a good illustration of this fact, as a free inflow of the 
oil-rent into the economy (that is for instance, an important allocation of the oil-rent to the 
provision of more welfare services) might bring with it the Dutch disease. Thus, the fear of the 
Dutch disease has forced politicians to embark in “fiscal consolidations” measures, which they 
delusorily justify by forecasting future potential economic gloom in Norway. This strategy of 
“story telling”, which is nothing but what is known as the Government House Ethics 
(Sidgwick), violates the principle of transparency. Though the politicians’ choice has a real 
economic efficiency, this choice may impair the “institutional capital”, which highly determines 
the Norwegian economic model. 
Keywords: Resource allocation, Welfare, Dutch disease, Transparency, Government House 
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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 
The western economic system has undergone a crisis since the end of 2008. But before that 
crisis, economic growth in the worst hit countries had been very low. In addition, these countries 
are, for the most part, highly indebted due to the accumulation of public deficit over years. 
Thus, the economic slowdown in these countries has on the one hand led to high unemployment, 
and on the hand has worsened the stance of public budget due to the drop in collected taxes and 
higher demand for welfare services like unemployment benefits for instance. The government 
of these countries have thus adopted fiscal consolidation measures in order to bring back their 
budget in a sustainable position. They have essentially lost the political freedom to the 
economic system which has been dominant. In other words, since then it is the primacy of the 
economic system that has been determining the budgetary policy there.  These countries seem 
to be affected by what may be called the 
“democratic indebtedness habit”, i.e. the 
habit of overspending in up-turn and/or 
accumulating debt, followed by their 
governments engaging in fiscal 
consolidation measures in down-turn due to 
a large debt. For instance, while the 
European Union recommends a guideline 
with a public debt that should not exceed 
sixty percent of the GDP, most of the pioneer 
E.U. countries (with some exceptions, such 
as Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands) 
have crossed the threshold of hundred 
percent of the GDP, as the figure above shows. As a result, a substantial part of the citizens in 
these countries go through unemployment and the rationing of welfare services at the same 
time.  Accordingly, the mobile part of the labour force from these countries move abroad where 
a more favourable economic situation is assumed to provide both employment and social 
welfare. For these economic migrants, Scandinavian countries are among the greatly prized 
destinations due to the echo of the Nordic model worldwide. I belong to that mobile part of 
labour and I left France for the reasons just mentioned. As a graduate in economics, studying 
the economic models of countries referred at as the wealthiest in the world, has always been 
my dream. Thus, though getting a job was my first motivation for moving to Norway, I ended 
Borrowing burden Source: Financial Times 
August 11th (Moore, 2015, s. 24). 
 
Figur 1. Borrowing burden Source: Financial 
Times August 11th (Moore, 2015, s. 24). 
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up realizing my dream by taking my Norwegian experience as an opportunity for an empirical 
research field.  
Once in Norway, the first observation is that unlike the highly indebted western countries, 
Norway does not have any deficit problem of this kind and has performed economically well 
during the western recession of the last decade (see the figure on the previous page). Norway 
“is a capitalist country but it is dominated by state-owned enterprises; it is an oil giant but it 
eschews conspicuous consumption. For decades this unusual economic model has served 
Norway well: in 1970 it was in Europe’s middle ranks as measured by income per head. 
Nowadays, Norwegians are richer than everyone in Europe except the Luxembourgers”. 
(Ryder, 2015). This is unusual for a natural resource-based country, considering the 
phenomenon of resource-curse, that is, the economic and institutional problems faced by 
(natural) resource-rich countries once they are in possession of their resource-rent. Thus, 
Norway, that started the exploitation of oil in the 1970s, has managed to escape the resource-
curse seemingly thanks to the establishment of an “oil fund”, where the revenues of the oil 
exploitation are transferred. A reason, put forward to explain the Norwegian economic success 
story in the literature on resource-curse, is the good quality of Norwegian institutions. Norway 
appears thus as a combination of efficient economic performance and a good quality of 
democratic institutions. Therefore, unlike the indebted democratic countries that have to engage 
in fiscal consolidation policies in order to bring their budget back to a sustainable level, 
theoretically, there would not be any reason to social welfare rationing in Norway. Though 
common sense would expect the wealth made of the oil-rent, among others, to help solve social 
problems more easily, social services (or welfare) rationing is also present in Norway as in 
some countries that register high levels of public debt. Indeed, while the indebted countries can 
simply justify their fiscal consolidation measures by 
their government budget deficits, the Norwegian 
politicians cannot use the same argument 
considering the sovereign fund (i.e. the oil fund). 
Considering the growth of the Norwegian wealth 
(i.e. the GDP including the oil fund) combined with 
low unemployment rate, the Norwegian economic 
situation may recall, to a certain extent, the French 
“Trente Glorieuses”, which means the Norwegian 
politicians have more political freedom 




than most other politicians. Yet, against all expectations, some reforms that imply the cuts of 
some social benefits are enacted by the politicians with the support of experts from the most 
forceful institutional triangle1 (i.e. the Norwegian Finance Ministry, Statistics Agency, and 
Central Bank). This Norwegian paradox has enhanced my interest in pursuing an inquiry of the 
Norwegian economic model, with a focus on the distribution of the national wealth. About this, 
the paradoxical behavior of the Norwegian politicians seem to be justified by the fear of the 
Dutch disease, which is the adverse effects of a boom in a sector (here the energy sector) on the 
traditional sectors (generally the manufacturing sector and/or the agriculture sector). Referring 
to the literature on the Dutch disease, the “favorable shock” in the Norwegian oil sector has 
entailed, besides the oil revenues, structural changes that can either impair or enhance the 
creation of value in other Norwegian key sectors. The evolution of these structural changes 
greatly depends on the ways the oil revenues are allocated (Brahmbhatt, Canuto, & 
Vostroknutova, 2010).  
Moreover, this inquiry shows how the difficulties in allocating the oil-rent can cause problems 
beyond the economic structure. The focus on the prevention of Dutch disease seems to have 
resulted in some democratic shortcomings like the issues of transparency and equity. 
Accordingly, the challenging trade-off faced by Norwegian politicians about the allocation of 
the Norwegian oil-rent has led them to overlook the principle of transparency, which may 
jeopardize the well-working of Norwegian institutions (and more generally of the political 
structure). Indeed, the Norwegian political system faced with an unprecedented economic 
freedom fears the great responsibility that is entailed that is why the politicians tend to follow 
the advice from the three strongest Norwegian institutions (i.e. the Norwegian Finance 
Ministry, Statistics Agency, and Central Bank), which leads to the primacy of the economic 
system. In Democracy, the outsiders rule over the insiders and the experts. The best reason for 
this is that even experts and insiders are outsiders in most issues and are therefore not experts 
in trade-off between various issues and values. Norway seems to owe its economic solidity to 
its institutions and the trust of the citizens to these institutions. One can then state that the 
Norwegian wealth comes out from natural capital, man-made capital, human capital, and more 
importantly from institutional capital. Politicians’ choice to slightly sacrifice transparency, in 
order to skirt economic challenges brought about by the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent, 
may impair this institutional capital. The purpose of this work is to analyze this Norwegian 
                                                 
1 Later on in the course of this work, I refer to this ‘most forceful institutional 
triangle’ as the ‘triangular guild’. 
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Paradox through the trade-off between the economic long run efficiency (i.e. the Dutch disease 
prevention) and the potential danger to the political institution, which is associated with the oil-
rent allocation method chosen by the Norwegian authorities. In brief, the work attempts to give 
find answers to the following questions: How is the Norwegian gigantic oil wealth allocated 
and why? Are politicians’ arguments concerning this allocation convincing? What are the 
consequences of politicians’ oil-rent allocation strategy for the Norwegian model? 
To proceed, the second chapter provides a presentation of the Norwegian oil fund as well as its 
nexus with the government budget. The third chapter explains the economic phenomenon of 
Dutch disease, one of the main factors that influence the allocation strategy chosen for the 
Norwegian oil-rent (that is the Fiscal Rule). The fourth chapter provides an explanation of why 
the scope of this paper is beyond the boundary of the mainstream economy theory, therefore 
why it is necessary to the term resort to political economy and to a certain extent to some aspects 
of philosophy. The fifth chapter clarifies the criteria defined in the Fiscal (or Budgetary) Rule, 
which is the allocative method politically chosen for the oil-rent and which has the quality to 
hedge Norway against the perceived Dutch disease threat. This fifth chapter illustrates via some 
examples how politicians tend to underrate the weight of the oil sector and overstate the future 
economic challenges in order to stick to the Fiscal Rule. Finally, this fifth chapter enables us to 
put forward the tragic outcomes and equity shortcomings (regarding the welfare of the present 
generation of citizens) brought about by the implementation of the Fiscal Rule. The sixth 
chapter then addresses the behavior of politicians backed by the most forceful institutional 
triangle (the Norwegian Finance Ministry, Statistics Agency, and Central Bank), which brings 
to the light some patterns of ‘hyper-democracy’ that may be detrimental to the Norwegian 
institutional capital. This part of the analysis has been difficult to write because it deals with 
negative distortions of what seem to me to be a very good institutional system. I feel convinced 
that there is no bad intentions behind the distortions but rather too much focus on uncertainty 
in terms of better ‘said than sorry’ (“føre var prinsippet” in Norwegian), which in reality shifts 
more of the burden of uncertainty onto the present generation than seems warranted. The 
Norwegian authorities have essentially argued for the primacy of the economic system, which 
is in countries with severe economic problems but not for a country which seems to have the 
more affluent public sector in the world. Eventually the seventh chapter concludes this work.  
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Chapter II.THE NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM REVENUES 
Before getting into the analysis of the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent, it is well-worth 
presenting what that oil-rent is made of, and this is the purpose of this chapter. 
II.1. THE NORWEGIAN OIL REVENUES 
The Norwegian oil-rent or Government petroleum revenues (often referred to as the 
government's net cash flow from petroleum activities) consists of three main elements: (i) taxes 
and charges from petroleum activities; (ii) operating profit in the state's direct financial interest 
(SDFI); and (iii) return on stakes in Statoil. 
II.1.1. Taxes and fees 
Taxes and fees are essentially taxes on the profits of undertakings engaged in the extraction of 
petroleum. Oil companies pay for the first general company tax equivalent to 28 percent of the 
profits. In addition, they pay a special tax that is based on the very good earnings potential of 
the business, i.e. the possibility of so-called economic rent.2 This special tax is assessed by the 
same basis as ordinary income tax, except for deductions for research grants and losses in other 
businesses on the shelf. The special tax is currently 50 percent, so that the formal marginal tax 
rate is 78 percent. In addition there are three other types of taxes namely, the tax on excess pay, 
the land tax and the CO2 tax. These are indirect taxes that are dependent on the amount of 
petroleum extracted. 
II.1.2. State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) and Return on Stakes in 
Statoil 
Besides taxes and fees, the Norwegian government directly owns the exploration and 
production licenses for petroleum and natural gas on the Norwegian continental shelf (via 
Petoro 80%, Statoil 15% and Norsk Hydro 5%). State's Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) – in 
Norwegian Statens Direkte Økonomiske Engasjement (SDØE) – was created in 1985 and is 
managed by the public corporation Petoro AS since 2001. State direct ownership in Statoil and 
SDFI provides a significant revenue through dividends and sale of shares. 
                                                 
2 Economic rent refers to the excess use of natural resources when these resources 




The following table shows these main components of the Norwegian oil revenues for 2010, 
2010 (The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2012). 
Table 1. The net government cash flow from petroleum activities in 2010 (bill. NOK). 
Direct taxes 155.6 
Environmental taxes, area fee and other 3.6 
SDFI 104.1 
Statoil dividend 12.8* 
Total: 276.0 
*Dividend for 2009 paid in 2010 
 
 
II.2. THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL (GPFG) AND THE 
RETURN FROM THE MANAGEMENT. 
State's total net cash flow from petroleum activities along with the return of the Fund's assets 
are entirely transferred into the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) – in Norwegian 
Statens pensjonsfond utland (SPU). Formerly called the oil fund (in Norwegian, oljefondet), the 
GPFG was established on June 22, 1990 by the Norwegian Parliament in order to manage the 
Norwegian financial asset stemming directly from petroleum. In other words, the Norwegian 
oil-rent is managed through the Government Pension Fund Global, that is, a sovereign fund. As 
such the oil revenues are invested worldwide in shares, bonds, real estates and other securities 
and consequently generate returns. 
 
II.2.1. The Repurchase and Agreements and Reverse Repurchase 
Agreements (Repos) 
In addition, there are liabilities relating to the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) that 
are Repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements (repos) in securities. They are 
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used instruments in the management of the Government Pension Fund Global. Fund sells a 
portfolio of securities with related agreement to acquire the portfolio return at a future date. For 
accounting purposes, “the portfolio remains on the asset side of the fund’s balance sheet, as 
does the cash received for the sale. The corresponding sales value is then entered as a loan from 
the buyer on the liability side of the balance sheet. The reverse situation is called a re-sale 
agreement or a reversed repo”; (http://www.ssb.no/en/offentlig-
sektor/statistikker/offogjeld/aar/2015-06-08). The European System of Accounts (ESA) 
requires repurchase agreements to be covered by balance sheet category loans. Liabilities 
related to repos in the GPFG are included in the official calculation of Norway’s gross debt. As 
repurchase agreements blow up both sides of the balance, the calculated gross debt gives, 
according to ESA, a misleading picture of the financial situation of the public sector in Norway. 
 
II.2.2. The Government Budget Surplus 
The last component of the others components of the GPFG is the Norwegian Government 
budget surplus. The parliament has decided, via a guideline called the Budgetary Rule, the 
transfer of a portion of the Fund's income to the state budget's revenue side. That transfer aims 
at filling the non-oil budget deficit. However, once the transfer is proceeded and the budget is 
in excess, that excess is returned back into the Government Pension Fund Global (i.e. the oil 
fund). The first net allocation to the fund was made in 1996 on the basis of a surplus in the 
government accounts for 1995. 
To summarize, the Norwegian oil-rent is made of the yearly government's net cash flow from 
petroleum activities, the yearly return of the oil fund's assets, as well as the Government budget 
excess:  
Net cash flow from the petroleum activities 
 – Non-oil deficit in the national budget 
 + Return on the fund’s investments  
+Government budget excess 
= Revenues for the Government Pension Fund – Global 
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Thus computed, the followings graphs and table illustrates the impressive growth of the 




Figure 1 Development in the market value of Government Pension Fund since 1996 (billions kroner).3.4 
Summing up this chapter, Norway has chosen to manage its oil revenues via a sovereign fund, 
called the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). The reason for this choice may certainly 
be the willingness of the present generation of citizens to save for the future generation of 
citizens. However, there may certainly be an additional reason; namely, the fear to incur the 
Dutch disease that tends to hit any economy that suddenly receives an inflow of foreign 
currencies as do, for example, natural resource-rich countries when they sell their commodities. 
The subsequent chapter, firstly, explains theoretically and illustrates empirically what the Dutch 
disease is, and then determines whether or not the choice of isolating the oil revenues in the 
GPFG has so far been an effective preventive strategy against the Dutch disease in Norway. 
 
                                                 
3  Sources: Norges Bank, Folketrygdfondet and Ministry of Finance; (Solberg & 
Finansdepartementet, 2014, s. 167). 
4 Up to and including 2005, a significant portion of the capital of SPN invested as an account 
to the Treasury. In December 2006, account loan scheme discontinued. This meant that the 
state fulfilled sight deposits at a value of 101.8 billion. Kroner, and a corresponding amount 
of the Fund's capital was repaid to the state. 
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Chapter III. UNDERSTANDING THE DUTCH DISEASE 
A number of articles in natural resource economics deal with the resource-curse phenomenon, 
that is, a trend for most (natural) resource-rich countries to register a lower growth than (natural) 
resource-poor countries. A certain number of factors, among others the Dutch disease, 
contributes to that phenomenon of resource-curse. The Dutch disease however does not remain 
a problem attributable only to a boom in extractive undertakings and more generally to natural 
resource related activities. Many other factors such as “poor management in some sectors of 
industry, […] international aid” from capital-rich countries to capital-poor countries, or any 
sudden “influx of foreign currency” can cause shrinkage of traditional sectors like 
manufacturing or agriculture sectors (i.e. the Dutch disease); (Afandiyev, 2013). It is well worth 
mentioning that though empirical papers on the Dutch disease applies to developed countries 
as well as developing countries, the generic concept of resource-curse fits better to developing 
countries while the Dutch disease, which is a more specific term, fits better to developed 
countries. In fact, developing countries that incur the Dutch disease face at the same time many 
others challenges that result in economic slowdown in a non-booming sector. Thus, it is actually 
difficult to isolate the Dutch disease effects and proceed to a study the findings of which are 
solely attributable to the Dutch disease. On the other hand, developed countries rely on age-old 
institutions, which makes it easy to dissociate structural changes inferable to the Dutch disease. 
That is why “most of the literature on the `Dutch disease´ refers to developed countries”; 
(Benjamin, Devarajan, & Weiner, 1989).  
Writings on the Dutch disease related problems date back to Cairnes (1859), who set forth 
economic slowdown in some tradable sectors of the economy subsequent to the Australian gold 
rushes. Later on, Maddock and McLean (1984) substantiated Cairnes’ observations by 
emphasizing how some non-tradable sectors of the economy expanded while some tradable 
sectors contracted. Meanwhile the interest for the Dutch disease decreased until the mining and 
oil shocks of the 70s, when the Dutch disease phenomenon regained interest, hence the 
development of a literature and models about it (Nowak & Grenier, 1995). The Dutch disease 
is a concept that appears for the first time on November 26, 1977 in The Economist and depicts 
the nexus between the economic development in the extractive sector and the economic decline 
in the manufacturing sector that occurred after the discovery and exploitation of natural gas 
field, which brought large income, in the Netherlands in 1959. More generally, the Dutch 
disease qualifies economic structural changes caused by a sudden expansion in a tradable sector 
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of the economy that has adverse effects on other tradable sectors of the economy. There are 
various types of purely economic models of Dutch disease, and four instances of them are 
presented next.   
The first type of model is described by Corden and Neary (1982) and Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen (1986), who stress the time dimension. They describe the effects of the boom in a 
tradable sector in the short run (when only the labor factor of production is perfectly mobile 
between the three sectors they consider), then in a medium run (when the capital factor of 
production becomes also mobile but between only two of the three considered sectors), and 
eventually in the long run (when both labor and capital become perfectly mobile between the 
three considered sectors). Despite their interesting findings, Corden and Neary’s (1984) then 
Neary and Van Wijnbergen’s (1986) model has been questioned because their time horizon 
would hardly match the hypothesis made on the mobility of production factors.  
The second type of Dutch disease model is developed by Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner 
(1989). They focus on cases when there is “imperfect substitutability between the non-tradable 
sector and the tradable lagging (non-booming) sector”. Their model fits better developing 
countries, where the lagging sector (that is for instance the manufactures sector) is mostly an 
importing (rather than exporting) sector. It follows then that the results got from Corden and 
Neary (1984) and Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986) model “can be reversed” since the 
appreciation of a currency tends to benefit importing (tradable) sector. In addition, they find out 
that some tradable sectors can escape the adverse effects of a (tradable) booming sector thanks 
to the differentiation of their product. Thus, their findings are, among others that not all the 
other tradable sectors would suffer from a sudden boom in a tradable sector. The criticism 
addressed towards Benjamin, Devarajan and Weiner’s (1989) model relies on the fact that 
taking account of product differentiation, indirectly, implies from the premises that sectors that 
output differentiated commodities do not really participate in international competition 
anymore. This, therefore, weakens their model since international competition (via sectors 
competitiveness) is one of the key aspects of in Dutch disease models.  
The third variety of Dutch disease model is put forward by Jean-Jacques Nowak and considers 
the intensity of the relationships between sectors. Such relationships may favor the return to 




The fourth instance of contribution to the Dutch disease model is by Egil Matsen and Ragnar 
Torvik (2003), who realize a positive analysis on the use of revenues made from the natural 
booming sector. Considering the fact that the Dutch disease emanates from the management 
made of these revenues, Egil Matsen and Ragnar Torvik work firstly highlights the 
impossibility to do without the Dutch disease and that “some Dutch disease is always optimal”; 
(Matsen & Torvik, 2003, s. 3). Their article provides the “optimal spending path of the resource 
wealth”; (Matsen & Torvik, 2003, s. 1). They indeed recommend the allocation of large 
transfers of the resource-rent to the present generation of citizens, when the use of this resource-
rent positively affect the growth of learning by doing- LBD (their proxy for productivity). 
Inversely, they recommend the allocation of large transfers of the resource-rent to future 
generation of citizens when the use of this resource-rent negatively affects the growth of LBD. 
They find in sum that “the higher the share of non-traded goods in consumption”, the weaker 
the positive effect of the use of the resource-rent on the growth of LBD and the stronger the 
negative effect on the growth of LBD. It follows in that case that “the more likely it is that the 
optimal spending path of the resource wealth is increasing over time”. (Matsen & Torvik, 2003, 
s. 3). 
This chapter relies firstly on Corden and Neary (1984) and Neary and Van Wijnbergen’s (1986) 
model since it appears as the standard theoretical model of the Dutch disease, considering the 
fact that the other models emerges from theirs. Afterwards, the second part presents two 
empirical cases of the Dutch disease; namely one that results from the boom in an extractive 
sector (in the Netherlands) and another the case of Norway, that is, where Norway stands 
relative to the Dutch disease.  
 
 
III.1. THE PURELY ECONOMIC THEORY ON THE DUTCH DISEASE. 
Among the various papers on the Dutch disease, a theoretical model developed in 1982 by the 
economists Corden and Neary appears as a reference model in the Dutch disease literature. The 
framework of multi-sector models inspires Corden and Neary in the design of their Dutch 
disease model (Corden & Neary, Booming Sector and De-Industrialization in a Small Open 
Economy, 1982). More precisely, they consider the case of a small open economy made of three 
main sectors, namely, the energy sector (that is generally termed the booming sector), the 
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manufactures sector (generally termed the lagging sector) and the services sector. The services 
sector is also known as the sector of non-tradable commodities as opposed to the two other (i.e. 
the booming and the lagging) sectors that output (internationally) tradable commodities. The 
booming and lagging sectors are equally referred to as exposed sectors. The price of the two 
tradable commodities considered are therefore set on international markets and are hence held 
constant in the model. On the other hand, the price of the non-tradable good (i.e. the price of 
services) results from the confrontation between the domestic demand and supply of services. 
The price of the non-tradable commodity is then supposed to vary in the model. The prices are 
considered relative (that is, the price of one sector commodity is expressed relative to the price 
of the commodity of another sector). Accordingly, in this framework the price of services (i.e. 
the non-tradable good) is expressed relative to the prices of the two tradable commodities (i.e. 
energy and manufactures). Therefore, in other words the price of services represents the 
exchange rate. The real wage that stands for the price of labor is flexible. As additional 
premises, the basic model considers that the three commodities are used for final consumption; 
the production function is of the Hicks-neutral technology type that is of the following form: 
, where  denotes the output or production,  denotes the technology, and  
any type of CES function. The consideration of a Hicks-neutral technology implies that the 
effect of boom is similar to the effect of rise in the output price. Two inputs are used namely 
the labor ( L ), also considered the “perfectly mobile” factor, as opposed to the capital ( K ) that 
represents the “specific factors” (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 827). Corden and Neary’s (1982) 
model focuses on “the de-industrialization aspect of the Dutch disease”. Their article is 
complemented by the Neary and Van Wijnbergen’s (1986) contribution that sets forth the two 
main effects that enable to detect the onset of the Dutch disease, namely the resource movement 
effect and the spending effects (Rudd, 1996). 
The resource movement effect 
The resource movement effect “describes the movement of mobile factors into the oil sector, 
bidding up their wages, and causing other sectors to contract” (Benjamin, Devarajan, & Weiner, 
1989, s. 73). To gain the insight into the resource movement effect only (and so ignore the 
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spending effect), “the income-elasticity5 of demand for services” is assumed zero. Then the 
dynamic goes as follows. First, the boom in the energy sector withdraws the labor from the 
lagging and services sectors. This resource movement effect corresponds to the direct de-
industrialization in favor of the booming sector. Next, the boom in the energy sector brings 
about the inflow of foreign currencies. This leads to the appreciation of the domestic currency 
as the demand for domestic currency becomes larger than the supply for the domestic currency. 
As a result, the exports from the lagging sector decrease since they become more expensive 
relative to the world market price. Hence, the lagging sector becomes less competitive and the 
demand for its commodities falls. The production of the lagging sector has then to be reduced 
in order to adjust to the decreased demand. This implies the cut of labor demand that translates 
into layoffs and thus the increase of unemployment. It is the indirect-deindustrialization.  
The spending effect 
The spending effect “refers to the use of the increased revenues” generated by the booming 
sector (Benjamin, Devarajan, & Weiner, 1989, s. 73). Just as in the preceding part, the resource 
movement effect is overlooked here by assuming that “the energy sector does not use any labor” 
in order to focus only on the spending effect. Then the mechanism works as follows. The boom 
in the energy sector entails new processes that boost the consumption of tradable and non-
tradable commodities inside the considered small open economy. This causes the rise of prices 
and wages in the non-tradable sector relative to those of the tradable sector. It is the real 
appreciation of relative price (or the exchange rate). The latter spills over the lagging sector 
and generates less competitiveness as just mentioned in the part devoted to the resource 
movement effect; (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 827). 
Currency real appreciation 
When defining the resource movement effect and the spending effect, the concept of currency 
appreciation appeared redundantly. It is actually an essential aspect when analysing the Dutch 
disease issue. Therefore, a clarification of this concept will, to an extent, ease the understanding 
of Corden and Neary’s model. The export of any commodity of tradable sectors leads to the 
                                                 
5  ln% change in demande
0










   

 that is the demand for 
services remains constant whatever the changes in the income. 
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inflow of foreign currencies into the domestic economy. The inflow of foreign currencies has 
two possible uses. On the one hand, the foreign currencies can be used directly for imports. In 
that case, the inflow of foreign currencies affects neither the internal money supply nor the 
demand for domestic goods. On the other hand, the inflow of foreign currencies can be 
converted into the local currency and used for the demand of goods produced domestically. 
Therefore, two cases are to consider; namely, if the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. If the 
exchange rate is fixed, the conversion of the inflow of foreign currencies generates an increase 
of the domestic money supply, which boosts the domestic demand, raises domestic prices and 
thus causes the real appreciation of the exchange rate. If the exchange rate is flexible, the 
increase of the supply of foreign currencies entails the rise of the domestic currency value, 
which is also nothing else but the real appreciation of the exchange rate. Thus with the domestic 
currency becoming stronger, the imports from abroad become easily affordable while the 
exports become more expensive, which can cause a deficit of the balance sheets, and then 
impacts negatively the balance of payment and entails the rise of unemployment. In summary, 
the boom in a sector brings an inflow of foreign currencies that leads to the domestic currency 
appreciation, loss of international competitiveness, and unemployment. 
A real appreciation corresponds to a rise in the real exchange rate that is the relative price of a 
currency. In Corden & Neary model the price of services output represent the domestic currency 
as it is the outcome from the confrontation between the demand and supply for services output. 
On the other hand, the price of the outputs in the lagging and the booming (tradable/ exposed) 
sectors are set on international markets. Thus the price of output from these tradable sectors 
represent foreign currencies. The real exchange rate is then illustrated by the ratio between the 
price of output from the services (non-tradable) sector ( Sp ) and the price of output from the 
tradable sectors ( Tp ).  In other words, the real exchange rate here is the “relative price of 




 . The real 
appreciation is thus caused by a rise in the output price from the services sector, as the price 
from the tradable sectors is held constant in this model. Appreciation occurs twice in Corden & 
Neary Model. Firstly due to resource movement effect, the price of output from the services 
sector has to rise so that the demand for services output adjusts to the supply for services output 
that has fallen. Next, the spending effect leads to an excess demand for services output, which 
also drives the price up so that the demand equals the supply. 
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Corden and Neary model goes through three scenarios in the course of time that are firstly when 
only the labor ( ) is mobile between the three sectors, next when the capital ( ) also becomes 
mobile but only between the services sector and the lagging (energy) sector, and finally when 
both capital ( ) and labor ( ) are mobile between the three sectors. The presentation of the 
three scenarios that follow conclude on whether over time the consequences of the resource 
movement and spending effects are reversible or not. 
 
III.1.1. The Model with Labor as the Only Mobile Factor: 
This first scenario corresponds to the resource movement effect and the spending effect of the 
booming sector in a short run. 
 Effects of the boom on the outputs: 
III.1.1.A.a. Energy sector output, EX  
Without any doubt, the resource movement and the spending effects both bring the output in 
the energy sector up ( EX ↗); (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 830). 
III.1.1.A.b. Services sector output, SX  
The resource movement effect does not induce great changes in the output of services but it 
tends to lower it slightly ( SX ↘) while the spending effect causes the rise of services output (
SX ↗); (Corden & Neary, 1982, ss. 830-31). Additional information about the value of the 
economic parameters are then necessary in order to determine which of the two effects 
dominates; see equation A 18 in the Appendix 1:    ˆ ˆ S E S E SA w p I           . 
III.1.1.A.c. Manufacturing sector output, MX  
The output in the manufactures sector goes down twice ( MX ↘): the first fall is the result of 
the direct de-industrialization caused by the first resource movement effect (that drains labor 
into the booming sector); the second drop is due to the indirect de-industrialization caused by 
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the spending effect that makes the manufacturing sector less competitive in the world market. 
(Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 831). 
 
 Effects of the boom on the real wage. 
The resource movement effect entails the rise of the real wage. Under the spending effect, the 
move of the real wage is undetermined as it can either rise or fall. In that case, it is hard to 
predict whether the effect of the boom on the real wage is a rise or fall once both effects (i.e. 
the resource movement and the spending) are considered. However, a fall in the real wage 
should be expected if the spending effect dominates the resource movement effect, and services 
occupy a great share in the consumption basket of the “wage-earners”; (Corden & Neary, 1982, 
s. 831). See equation (A19) in the Appendix 1:  
      ˆ ˆS S E S S E S S SA w p I                 
 
 Effects of the boom on the return to the specific factors (or 
the capital) of the three sectors. 
In Corden and Neary’s model, a common proxy for the measure of the returns to the specific 
factors in the three sectors is “the profitability of each sector”. The measurement of the concept 
of profitability used here is further explained in Appendix 3. As this part only deals with the 
short run effect of the boom in the energy, the analysis now focuses on the concept of absolute 
profitability. The consideration of the relative profitability fits better with a longer run; hence, 
it is used in the next scenarios. 
 
III.1.1.C.a. Effects of the boom on the profitability (i.e. the return to the 
specific factor) of the energy sector 
The profitability (that is, the return to the specific factor) in the energy sector rises under the 
resource movement effect but falls under the spending effect. The return to specific factor in 
any sector depends on the general profitability and therefore on the sales in the considered 
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sector. As the price in the energy sector is set in the world market, the return to the specific 
factor in the energy sector will be less than the return to the specific factor in the non-tradable 
(services) sector. The latter actually benefits from the spending effect, unlike the return to the 
specific factor in the booming (and exposed) sector6 (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 832); see 
equation A 20 in the Appendix 1:  
   ˆKE E S LE E S LE E S S LE EAr I I                     
  
III.1.1.C.b. Effects of the boom on the profitability (i.e. the return to the 
specific factor) in the services sector 
The spending effect (i.e., the increase of services consumption) drags profitability in the 
services sector up while under the resource movement effect profitability may fall (because of 
the rise in the wage is measured in terms of all goods and real appreciation). Therefore, the final 
effect of the boom on the profitability of the services sector cannot be determined without 
additional information on which of the two effects dominates. (Corden & Neary, 1982, ss. 831-
832). 
 
III.1.1.C.c. Effects of the boom on the profitability (i.e. the return to the 
specific factor) in the manufactures sector 
The resource movement effect removes labor from the manufactures sector that does not really 
benefit from the spending effect, as it is an exposed sector (its price is set on the world market). 
Therefore, the profitability (in absolute value) in the manufactures (lagging) sector is expected 
to fall (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 831). However were the relative profitability considered here, 
the mentioned fall may have been less pronounced depending on “factor intensities7 in terms of 
the value shares” in the output.  Thus, in the short run, the effect of boom in the manufacturing 
sector is de-industrialization. In addition the real appreciation caused by the spending effect 
                                                 
6 This is «more likely the greater the rise in the wage rate, which means in turn the smaller 
is the compensated price-elasticity of demand for services and the larger is its income-
elasticity of demand»; (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 832). 
7 Factor intensity=(Capital/Labor) Ratio. 
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renders the manufacturing sector less competitive. Hence a boom in the energy sector translates 
by “a fall in manufacturing output and employment, a worsening of the balance of trade in the 
manufacturing, and a fall in the real return to factor specific to manufacturing sector (though 
not necessarily in their return relative to those of factors specific to other sectors)”; (Corden & 
Neary, 1982, s. 841). 
 
III.1.2. Model with Capital Mobile between Two Sectors. 
This scenario addresses the effects, in the medium term, of the boom in the energy sector. In 
this scenario, the labor (i.e. the perfectly mobile factor) continues to be mobile between the 
three sectors: (i) the energy (or booming) sector, (ii) the manufactures (or lagging) sector, and 
(iii) the services sector. The difference with the former scenario resides in the fact that the 
capital (that stands for the specific factors) becomes also mobile but only between the 
manufacturing and the services sectors. The implication is that the sector relationships, in term 
of factor-intensities, now matters. More specifically, the resource movement effect and the 
spending effect will affect differently the sectors depending on whether it is the manufactures 
sector that is more or less capital-intensive than the booming and services sectors, or vice-versa. 
It is assumed that the manufactures sector is more capital intensive than the services sector. 
(Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 833). Appendix 2 is a support for a better understanding of this part. 
 
 Effect of the boom on the output  
III.1.2.A.a. Energy sector output, EX  
The boom in the energy sector entails the resource movement effect that translates into the 
move of labor from the services then the manufacture sectors to the energy sector. The output 
of the energy sector is thereby adjusted upwards.  
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III.1.2.A.b. The output in “the two mobile capital sectors”: MX and SX
. 
Referring to “the Rybczynski theorem8” (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 833), under the resource 
movement effect, the output of the capital-intensive sector will rise while the output of the 
labor-intensive sector will fall. As it is assumed that the manufactures sector is capital-intensive 
and the services sector labor-intensive, then the services sector will be the one to suffer more 
from the labor drained by the booming (energy) sector: SX ↘. The manufactures sector 
however will not experience de-industrialization but rather “pro-industrialization”: MX  ↗ in 
the medium run; (Corden & Neary, 1982, ss. 833-34).  
When then the spending effect takes place, the demand for services rises, which drives up the 
output in the services sector “and thus squeezes manufacturing output, irrespective of the 
relative factor-intensities of the two sectors”. (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 834). 
 
 Effects of boom on the real wage rate. 
The resource movement that operates in the advantage of the booming sector drives the real 
wage up. This trend is then enhanced by the spending effect that also brings the relative price 
up; (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 834). 
 
 Effects of the boom on return to the specific factors in the 
three sectors. 
Recall that as mentioned in the first scenario, a common proxy for the measurement of the 
returns to the specific factors in the three sectors is “the profitability of each sector”. Unlike the 
previous scenario where the concept of absolute profitability was used, this section resorts to 
the concept of relative profitability that matches best with a “somewhat longer time horizon” 
(Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 833). The relative profitability is the profitability of one sector 
                                                 
8 See Appendix 2.2., for explanation. 
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relative to the profitability of another sector. As the capital is mobile between the manufactures 
and the services sector in this scenario, then it is simply assumed that the two sectors use the 
same specific factor (i.e., capital). Accordingly, there is one return to capital or return to specific 
factor (measured by the profitability) for the two sectors, MSr , relative to the return-to-specific 
factor of the energy sector, Er . 
III.1.2.C.a. Effects of the boom on the profitability (i.e. the return to the 
specific factor) in the energy sector 
The energy sector registers an increasing profitability: Er ↗as long as the boom lasts. 
III.1.2.C.b. Effects of the boom on the profitability (i.e., the return to the 
specific factor) in the manufactures and services sectors 
The profitability of the two sectors relative to the energy (booming) sector, MSr  , decreases first 
under the resource movement effect then a second time under the spending effect, when one 
assumes that the manufactures sector is more capital-intensive than the services sector. On the 
other hand, when the services sector is presumed more capital-intensive than the manufacturing 
sector, the common relative profitability, MSr ,  first falls under the resource movement effect, 
then rises under the spending effect. More information is required in order to know which of 
the two effects dominates. The dynamic is summarized as follows; see Table 1, (Corden & 
Neary, 1982, s. 835): 
 
Table 2. Resource Movement and Spending Effects When Capital is Mobile Between Manufacturing and 
Services. 
 Resource movement effect Spending effect 
M Sk k  , , ,S M S MSX X p w r      , , ,S M S MSX X p w r      
M Sk k  , , ,S M S MSX X p w r      , , ,S M S MSX X p w r      




This second scenario depicts the mechanism of the boom effect in a medium run by allowing 
the mobility of the specific factor (i.e., the capital) between the services and manufactures 
sectors. The findings of this scenario are that some of the outcomes of the previous scenario 
would be reversible. This is the case, for instance, when one considers rather the concept 
relative profitability than absolute profitability, and whether the manufactures sector is more 




III.1.3. The Model with Complete Capital Mobility. 
This third scenario addresses the long-term effects of the boom in the energy sector, that is, why 
it allows the mobility of the two factors (i.e. capital and labor) among the three sectors. This 
scenario differs quite a lot from the two first. The basic premise here is that the manufactures 
sector would be more capital-intensive than the services sector but less capital intensive than 
the energy sector (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 835). 
 
 The effect of the boom on both (factors and commodities) 
prices 
The prices are just affected by the resource movement effect. The spending effect does not play 
any role here because the variation of prices is “independent of the magnitude of the income-
elasticity of demand for services” (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 836). The prices change through 
the dynamic of market mechanism. The main feature of this scenario regarding price change is 
that “the expansion of the relatively capital-intensive sector pushes down the real wage” and 
therefore a fall in the relative price of services (that is, a depreciation). This fall in the real wage 
will change the allocation of factor inputs by the “substitution of labor for capital” (Corden & 
Neary, 1982, s. 838). 
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III.1.3.A.a. The effect of the boom on factor prices. 
To gain the insight into factor prices, Corden & Neary look at the factor-intensity between the 
energy sector and the manufactures sector. Thus, “real wages rise if and only if manufacturing 
is capital-intensive relative to the energy sector”, in other words if 
M Ek k  (Corden & Neary, 
1982, s. 837).  
III.1.3.A.b. The effect of boom on the price of services.  
To gain the insight into the price of services, Corden &Neary compare the factor-intensity 
between the manufactures sector and the services sector. “The price of services rises if and only 
if manufacturing […] capital-labor ratio is either greater than or less than that in both other 
sectors” that is if M E Sk k k  or if M S Ek k k  ; (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 837).  
 The effect of the boom on outputs. 
Unlike prices, the outputs in the three sectors are affected not only by the resource movement 
effect, but also by the spending effect. 
III.1.3.B.a. In the manufactures sector. 
The boom “raises the return of the factor used intensively by the energy sector relative to the 
manufacturing sector”; (Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 838). As it is presumed that the energy sector 
is more capital-intensive than the manufactures sector, the resource movement effect induces a 
drop in the manufactures sector, and consequently induces “direct de-industrialization”; 
(Corden & Neary, 1982, s. 838). This, indeed, happens if one assumes that the services sector 
does not change its production while the capital intensity dampens in the manufactures and the 
energy sector. This is one of six possible findings concerning this scenario. 
III.1.3.B.b. In the services sector. 
The output of the services sector rises on the one hand because of the fall of services relative 
price and on the other hand because of “national income rise” brought by the boom proceeds. 
All that has been said can be summarized in the following table: 
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Table 3: Effects of the Boom on Prices When Capital is Mobile between All Three Sectors.9 
 
M Sk k  M Sk k  
M Ek k  ,Sp w   ,Sp w   
M Ek k  ,Sp w  
10 ,Sp w   
 
In bulk, Corden and Neary’s model highlights how the boom in a sector of the economy can 
weaken other sectors and turn the benefits brought by the booming sector into the cause of 
economic slowdown. However, when considering the medium run – that is, when capital 
becomes mobile between the manufacturing and services sectors – Corden and Neary discover 
that the negative impacts of the resource movement and the spending effects are reversible 
(Corden & Neary, 1982, ss. 826-841). The government intervention through, for instance, 
investment in education and infrastructure or protectionism may help boost the competitiveness 
of the lagging (manufactures) sector so that the whole economy is not in crisis when the 
booming sector is in crisis. In a longer period, their findings are more complex since the 
hypotheses to take into account increase substantially. In addition, in the long run many others 
factors than the sole booming effect of the energy sector may affect the economic variables or 
cause economic structural changes.  
Corden and Neary’s model enables to explain the Dutch disease (DD) occurrence to a certain 
extent; that is, on the one hand the induced de-industrialization via the resource movement 
effect, and on the other hand, the relative price appreciation that can lead to the deficit of the 
balance sheets via the spending effect. However their model neglects the political aspect that 
plays a substantial role in the case of the Netherlands’ Dutch disease namely, the management 
by the government of the wealth generated by the booming sector. Thus, according to Corden 
(1984)  (in Jean-Philippe Stijns, 2002: 10), “the true DD in the Netherlands was not the adverse 
effects on manufacturing of real appreciation but rather the use of the booming sector revenues 
for social services levels which are not sustainable”, and “which has been politically difficult 
to reduce”. The Paradox of Plenty or the Dutch disease would, thus, take place when the wealth 
                                                 
9 “Factor price equalization is an economic theory, by Paul A. Samuelson (1948), which states 
that the prices of identical factors of production, such as the wage rate, or the return to capital, will be 
equalized across countries as a result of international trade in commodities”.  (Oluwatosin, 2013). 
10 The case illustrated. 
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generated by the booming sector has been slackly let to inflowi the economy and has not been 
sufficiently saved.  
The part that follows contains an empirical illustration of the Dutch disease through the 
Netherlands which underwent the Dutch disease owing to a boom in the energy (specifically 
the gas) sector. This case of the Netherlands experience of the Dutch disease will afterwards 
facilitate the determination of Norway situation. In other words, it will make it easier to find 
out where Norway stands as for Dutch disease, once the analysis of the Netherlands is done.  
 
III.2. THE NETHERLANDS’ EXPERIENCE OF THE DUTCH DISEASE 
The Dutch disease occurs in the Netherlands in the 1970s, that is, during the period of the 
Keynesian deficit norms11 that started around 1957 (the period of boom in the natural gas 
exploitation sector), and it tapers roughly around 1982 (see the Table below). In the same period 
(i.e. 1970–l980), the gas price (that mirrors the oil price) was increasing. Thus, the Dutch 
government used the Dutch gas-rent to cover the growing expenditures caused by the Dutch 
disease. 
Table 4: Fiscal policy in the Netherlands since 1957: Official principles 
 
Before exploring the policies by the Dutch government, this section sets out the indexes that 
lead to the statement that the Netherlands have indeed experienced (through the resource 
movement effect and the spending effect) the Dutch disease.  
                                                 
11 There are three main periods of fiscal policy reforms by the Dutch government: the 
balanced budget period (from 1814 to 1956), then Keynesian deficit norms period (from 
1957 to 1979), and the norms for reducing deficit and debt period (since 1980). 
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III.2.1. The resource movement effect and the spending effect in the 
Netherlands. 
 The mechanism of resource movement effect in the 
Netherlands. 
The resource movement effect that manifests by “the competition for factors of production” 
between sectors has not been very striking “in the Netherlands where the natural gas sector does 
not employ a large number of people”. About this, “Kremers (1986) notes that the labor 
requirement of the gas industry in Holland has ‘never put pressure on other sectors’ (p. 101) in 
terms of increased wages”, at least directly. In an indirect way, the Dutch gas industry seems to 
have attracted labor from other sectors if we consider the fact that the Dutch government 
resorted to “productivity tables from many sectors of the economy in establishing certain 
industry-wide wages”. However, the adjustment of wages to the rise in productivity does not 
stay inside the gas sector only, but ripples to “the wages in the economy”. Thus in the 1990s 
the manufacturing employment registered “82% of 1975 figures (International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook 1995)”, which is certainly a slight drop; (Rudd, 1996). As a conclusion to 
this part, the direct de-industrialization that would have been caused by an upward bid of gas 
sector wage was minor in the Netherlands. 
 The mechanism of spending effect in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch manufacturing sector was hardly hit by the indirect de-industrialization, that is, the 
loss of labor due to the appreciation of the Dutch currency (i.e. the Guilder) that deteriorated 
the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. Indeed, “the price of gas used to be linked to 
the oil price” (Beetsma, Giuliodori, Walschot, & Wierts, 2012). Accordingly, the first oil shock 
of 1973 stretched the gas proceeds, the balance of payment surpluses, and certainly the inflow 
of foreign currencies, causing thereby the appreciation of the Dutch Guilder. The Dutch 
manufacturing output became more expensive relative to the world market price. This loss of 
the Dutch manufacturing sector competitiveness resulted in the reduction of its supply that led 
to labor cuts and hence an increase of unemployment. The latter, combined with inflation and 
high level of wages, brought stagnation to the Dutch economy. The stagnation turned to 
26 
 
stagflation12 around 1975. The economic growth moved “from about 5% in the 1960s and early 
1970s to an average of about 2% after 1975. 
In sum, the spending effect weighed more than the resource movement effect during the 
Netherlands Dutch disease. However, a third factor – the management of the gas-rent by the 
government – played an important role in the Netherlands’ Dutch disease. The subsequent 
section deals with the contribution of that factor which is rather political. 
 
 The role of the Netherlands government expenditure in the 
Dutch disease experience. 
The government expenditures rised considerably as soon as the gas revenues began to accrue. 
In fact “a large portion of the revenue accrues to the government either through direct ownership 
of natural gas facilities or through a tax on private natural gas companies’ earnings” (Rudd, 
1996). In the years that followed the Second World War (around 1957), the government budget 
was included in the Dutch national accounts and the Dutch government undertook the 
Keynesian deficit norms. “The underlying principle was to better manage the national economy 
by the size of the government deficit” (Tanzi, 2008). The high but temporary revenues from the 
natural gas exploitation were used to relax the government budgetary constraints. For example, 
the Dutch public expenditure increased from “about 30% of GDP in 1950 to 60% in 1983” 
(Frits Bos, 2006a)”;  from 1959 to the 1990s, the Dutch “nominal government expenditures 
have risen by over 3500% (International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995)”;  (Rudd, 1996). 
The following graphs and table summarize well the economic changes registered in the 




                                                 
12 Stagflation is a combination of inflation and stagnation (or immobilism that is a long 





Table 5. Fiscal policy in the Netherlands since 1957: keys statistics (per cent of GDP. 
 Public Debt Public expenditure Taxes and social security contributions Other revenue Public balance 
1957 90 33 28 6 0 
1973 42 45 39 7 1 
1979 43 54 43 9 -2 
1983 60 60 44 11 -5 
1993 77 57 45 9 -3 
2007 47 46 40 6 0 
 
 
Figure 2.Dutch public expenditure as percentage of GDP since 1814. 
 
 
Figure 3. Government balance as a percentage of GDP since 1814. 
. 
From around 1957–1973, the Dutch public debt decreased probably thanks to the revenues of 
the natural gas exploitation and the increase in taxes and social security contributions. The 
period 1973–1993 was characterized by the increase in the Dutch public debt, in taxes and 
social security contributions and other revenues (1973–1983). In the whole period, that is, 
1957–1993, the Dutch public expenditure has just been growing, from 33% to 57% of the GDP. 
In bulk the Keynesian deficit norms implied the use of the gas-rent in order to support the 
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conjuncture and to provide more welfare (social security) in the Netherlands. All this spotlights 
that the Dutch gas-rent has been allocated to abate the effects of the Dutch disease that is 
economic downturn. The period 1970s–1980s was challenging for “the Dutch government, due 
to the drastically increased size […] of Dutch public finance, unexpected economic setbacks 
and substantial fluctuations in natural gas revenues”. The stagflation increased the public 
expenditure owing, for instance, “to unemployment benefits and government salaries, while tax 
revenues reduced”. Thus the Dutch government budget, which was in excess or balanced since 
the flow of the gas-rent, started to record deficit (i.e., 3% of the GDP) since 1975. Overall, the 
retrospective look at the Dutch economy subsequent to the exploitation of natural gas reveals 
that the Dutch disease that occurred there was mainly favored by the way the gas-rent was 
allocated. In fact, when the booming sector began to slow down (as the gas price entered a 
declining path) from the 1980s, the government couldn’t continue anymore with expansionist 
policy in order to lessen the increase of unemployment caused by the Dutch disease. Thus, the 
Dutch gas adventure turned to a curse, the Dutch disease. 
III.2.2. The remedy against the Dutch disease. 
Later on, it became a necessity for the Dutch government to cut its expenditure in order to 
“improve the balance of payments position”. The collaboration of the Dutch government with 
independent organizations such the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), Statistics Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Court of Audit, and the National advisory Group on Budgetary Principles brought 
about the adequate policy that led The Netherlands, since the 1980s, to economic recovery. For 
instance, “the introduction in 1994 of the trend-based budgeting13 with expenditure ceilings 
from the whole term of government, and one decision-making moment a year, turned out to be 
effective solutions”; (Bos, 2008). 
The presentation of the Netherlands experience of the Dutch disease, just done, enables us to 
easily check whether Norway has experienced some features of the Dutch disease. The attention 
is drawn at the evolution of some economic variables such as the labor force (or labor demand) 
in the oil industry relative to the other industries and services, the Norwegian currency value 
(inflation and exchange rate), the Norwegian balance sheet and balance of payment, 
government budget, and economic growth…  
                                                 




III.3. HAS NORWAY INCURRED THE DUTCH DISEASE? 
As the case-study of the Netherlands economy has enabled to explain, the Dutch disease is an 
economic crisis that results not only from structural changes in the production due to the focus 
on a booming sector, but also from the excessive use of the booming sector revenues. Indeed 
when an economy relies mainly on a booming sector and the latter revenues are not run in a 
way that enables to cross out the adverse effects, situations like the one experienced by The 
Netherlands may occur. Norway records a boom in its petroleum sector since the early 1970s. 
This section audits whether Norway has showed any symptoms of the Dutch disease since the 
oil-rent started to flow. The analysis is proceeded by the observation of the evolution of the 
GDP, the total factor productivity- TFP, the changes in labor per sector (for the resource 
movement effect), the wage rate and domestic price (for the spending effect). Appendix 10 
provides main economic statistics on Norway for more information. 
 
Legend: Gross product, all industries; Real disposable income; Total factor productivity, market-oriented mainland 
industries; Contribution of capital intensity; Hours worked in all; Production price in terms of price in domestic 
markets; Export price in all, in relation to the import price. 
Figure 4. Growth in real disposable income, gross product, and man-hours in all per capita, as well as terms 
of trade gains and total factor productivity and capital per hour worked in the market- oriented mainland 
industries. Index 1971 = 100.14 
Figure 4 provides some economic key variables whom evolution since the start of oil 
exploitation does not suggest any obvious feature of the Dutch disease: the gross product, the 
                                                 





real disposable income, the total factor productivity all display a steady increasing trend (with 
a slight fall in 2008s) since 1971. The price in what we can refer to as non-exposed or non-
tradable sector has been held almost constant over the considered period. In addition, as shows 
the following figure 7, unemployment in Norway is among the lowest of the OECD countries. 
 
Legend: Measures for jobseekers (left axis); registered unemployment (right axis). 
Figure 5. Measures for job seekers and unemployment. 1000 people and percent; (Finansdepartement D. K., 
2013-2014, s. 103). 
 
 
III.3.1. The resource movement effect and direct de-industrialization. 
The following figure displays the evolution of labor in the primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors in Norway since 1930. To investigate the occurrence of resource movement effect, we 
resort to the following fig. 6 that displays the move of labor over the period 1970-2007. 
Referring to Corden & Neary model, the primary sector can be considered the lagging tradable 
sector, the secondary sector can be assumed the booming tradable sector as it include the 
Norwegian energy sector, and the tertiary sector the services (non-tradable) sector. 
 
Legend: Primærnæringer = Primary industries (agriculture, forestry, fishing and aquaculture); Sekundærnæringer = 
Secondary industries (oil production, mining, manufacturing, construction and gas and water supply); 
Tjenesteytenæringer = Services industries. 




Since the 1970s, one cannot assert that the secondary sector that includes the oil industry has 
absorbed a substantial part of labor from the primary lagging sector. In fact, the primary sector 
starts losing labor since the 1935s and the fall becomes quite steeper in the period 1945s-1970.  
The fall in the labor from the primary sector (though it continues) has rather slowed down since 
the start of oil exploitation in the 1970s. Thus the boom in the oil industry (or more generally 
in the secondary sector) has not generated an obvious direct deindustrialization, as the share of 
labor in the secondary sector has rather slightly decreased after the 1970s. However, this fig. 6 
displays some features of indirect deindustrialization: indeed, the tertiary is the sector that has 
been benefiting from the fall in labor from the primary lagging sector and the secondary 
booming sector, since the boom of the 1970s in the Norwegian energy sector. This explains by 
the spending effect that is the object of the subsequent subsection. 
III.3.2. The monitored spending effect and indirect de-industrialization. 
As observed in the previous subsection, the boom in secondary sector (the proxy of the booming 
sector) has not really distorted the Norwegian sectorial structure. In other words, the direct-
deindustrialization has been negligible in Norway due to a very weak noticed resource 
movement effect. This subsection pursuits the analysis by investigating this time the spending 
effect.  
The analysis of the wage rate level in Norway can be used as an indicator for the spending 





Figure 7. Hourly wage costs in manufacturing industry. Norway relative to our EU20 trading partners. 
Common currency. 2013. Trading partners = 10016. 
Figure 7 provides a comparison of the Norwegian hourly wage costs to some European 
countries. Thus Norway has the highest hourly wage rate, which can be interpreted as an 
externality of natural resource (including oil-rent). Though this fig.7 is just for 2013, the 
Norwegian position regarding wage level is not something that happened suddenly but is to link 
to the inflow of oil revenues that dates back to 1970s. High wages incontestably play a great 
role in setting off the spending effect. This spending effect is certainly behind the slight indirect-
deindustrialization noticed in the previous figure (fig. 6), where a share of labour from the 
primary and the secondary sector has been channelled into the tertiary sector. Thus, this indirect 
deindustrialization has not brought high unemployment in Norway, but has enhanced the size 
of labor in the tertiary sector. Indeed the growth of labor in the tertiary sector (that assumedly 
stands for the services sector) since the start of oil exploitation in Norway is attributable to the 
increase of output from tertiary sector, which is driven by the increase in demand for tertiary 
goods. This increase in the demand for tertiary goods comes from the inflow of oil revenues 
that spreads, among others, to wages that raises the purchasing power of Norwegian citizens: 
Secondary Sector Tertiary Goods Tertiary Sector.Wage PurchasingPower Demand Labor   . 
It is worth emphasizing that this indirect de-industrialization is quite modest probably due to a 
moderate spending effect. Indeed, though the Norwegian wage rate is certainly among the 
highest of the OECD countries, Norway is among the OECD countries that have the highest 
                                                 
15 Using exchange rates from 2 February 2015, with the wage level in national currency in 2013 remaining fixed. Sources: The Norwegian 
Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements and the Ministry of Finance. (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, NOU 2015: 1 
Productivity – Underpinning Growth and Welfare, 2015, s. 6). 
 
16 Source: (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, NOU 2015: 1 Produktivitet – grunnlag for vekst og velferd, 
2015, s. 55). 
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levels of tax with a reasonable government expenditure relative to the national wealth. Thus, 
the spending effect is somehow quite closely monitored in Norway via high tax and reasonable 
provision of social welfare services. The oil-rent of for its great part blocked in a sovereign 
fund, the GPFG. 
Norway has seemingly managed to avoid most of the obvious features of the Dutch disease 
thanks to a neutralization of its oil-rent. The direct deindustrialization has been negligible due 
to an insignificant resource movement effect and the indirect deindustrialization slight due to a 
mastered spending effect.  
 
III.3.3. The monitored exchange rate of the Norwegian currency. 
The increase of demand for tertiary goods has an additional outcome that is the rise of price of 
tertiary goods so that the supply of tertiary goods adjusts to this large demand for tertiary goods. 
Referring to Corden & Neary model (in Chapter 3), by assumption, the tertiary sector is the 
protected sector (and thus the price of output from the tertiary represents the Norwegian 
domestic currency) while the primary and secondary represent by hypothesis the tradable or 
internationally exposed sectors (and thus the prices of their outputs denotes foreign 
currencies).Then the relative price of tertiary output to the price of output from the (aggregated) 
















   
 
The neutralization of the oil revenues in the sovereign pension fund (i.e. the GPFG), maintains 
the purchasing power of the present generation of Norwegian citizens in a quite lower level 
than what it would have been if the oil revenues would have been let to freely inflow inside the 
Norwegian economy. This brakes the demand for goods from the tertiary sector and as a result 
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keeps the value of the Norwegian Crown (i.e. the currency) in a reasonably low level, which is 






Figure 8. Norwegian Crown exchange rate index. 1990 = 100. Higher number means weaker krone; 
(Finansdepartement D. K., 2013-2014, s. 30). 
Figure 8 shows how the value of the Norwegian currency has from 2001 until 2008 been kept 
in a somehow low level considering the size of the oil proceeds. Though the figure exhibits an 
appreciation from 2008s, 2015’s first semester has registered a fall in Norwegian Crown value. 
All this supports the argument that keeping the oil-rent abroad enables to prevent the 
appreciation of the Norwegian currency, which preserves the competitiveness of the tradable 
(primary and secondary sector). However, the volatility noticed in the evolution of the Crown 
exchange rate may reveal the persistence of the Dutch disease threat. In fact withdrawing the 
oil revenues from the sovereign fund where they are kept, in order to finance for instance the 
government budget has the same effect as the inflow of foreign currencies from the export of 
oil, into the Norwegian economy: this effect is the Norwegian currency appreciation. It follows 
that the Norwegian oil-rent cannot be freely allocated.  
To conclude on this section, the Norwegian economy has escaped the resource movement 
effects due to the original structure of its sectors. The real threat that has hang and still hangs 
on Norway is the spending effects that constitute a constraint for the allocation of the Norwegian 
oil-rent. This may be the incentive behind the choice of the current method of oil-rent allocation 
(i.e. the Fiscal rule) that prescribes the isolation of a great part of the oil proceeds out of the 
Norwegian economy. 
The Chapter 5 presents some consequences of the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent that is 
bound by the threat of the Dutch disease. But before, that the subsequent chapter (i.e. Chapter 
4) clarifies the scope of this work, which expands over the boundaries of the mainstream 
economics and reaches the domain of political economy. The first reason is as seen in the 
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previous chapter: the Dutch disease issue has both an economic dimension and a political 
dimension. The second reason is that, as it will be presented in the subsequent part, the 
Norwegian oil-rent is redistributed mostly through the social welfare programs. Addressing this 








Chapter IV.THE INTERCONNECTION OF THE ECONOMIC, 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AREAS REGARDING THE 
REDISTRIBUTION OF THE NORWEGIAN OIL-RENT.  
This chapter explains why the case study of the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent cannot be 
tackled only through a purely economic perspective but by taking into account the political (and 
more precisely democratic) and legal aspects. Thereby this work is an inquiry in the realm of 
political economy and as such, it resorts somehow to moral philosophy since political 
economy17 also derives from moral philosophy. When the political aspects are included in the 
analysis, the term Dutch disease becomes problematic but more realistic. In the case of The 
Netherlands for instance, the Dutch voters and politicians willingly chose to spend more of the 
gas revenues and by doing so freely took some long-term risks for present benefits. More 
precisely the allocation of the natural gas proceeds by the Dutch authorities promoted the 
welfare of the citizens through the increase of social services in the short run. However, in the 
end that allocation choice of the gas-rent turned out later to entail stagflation beyond the one 
experienced by other European countries in the same period. Indeed, they expressed their true 
preferences, even though it brought about economic slowdown. The political system, so 
speaking, took risk with the economic system that incurred negative consequences in terms of 
stagflation and currency appreciation. By calling this a disease seems to indicate that there was 
something wrong with the voters, the politicians, or the Dutch democracy. Indeed, the term 
disease comes from the perspective of the premise of the economic system but in Europe, we 
surely have with a wide limit the premise of the political system. The Dutch experience could 
occur in Norway, where the oil-rent could be sold by politicians to the voters and generate an 
economic gloom. In fact, the politicians could be tempted to sell the oil-rent benefits because 
their programs should reflect voters’ expectations in order to stay in office. But what is shown 
in the next is rather the politicians’ restraint to allocate more oil-rent to the welfare of present 
generation of Norwegian citizens. All these cases show the nexus between decisions taken 
politically and their effects on the economic structure.  
The issues associated with the Norwegian oil-rent allocation, just as many contemporary and 
persistent economic challenges registered worldwide, show the limit of analyses that rely on 
fragmented social sciences and thereby call for “complexity science” that “produces a unified 
                                                 
17 The political economy is an interdisciplinary approach of studying economic behavior 




field of analysis”. Regrettably no such analysis exists we seem to be condemned to live in a 
various silo as a result of the division of labour and social sciences; (Tett, 2015). Recalling the 
origin of the term Dutch disease that applies to the Dutch case, though, it addresses mostly 
economic problems, several aspects are of political nature. In fact, the Dutch disease can be 
summarized as socio-economic consequences of “irrational” economic decisions taken 
politically. Through this work, we saw how the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent requires 
considering at the same time the oil industry (in order to understand how the oil revenues get 
to the government via the tax institution), the sovereign fund (where it is saved via a global 
investment), the Fiscal Rule (that is the guideline of the allocation), and considering the 
government budget (that is the channel by which the oil-rent reaches the citizens). Analysing 
the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent only from a purely economic point of view “as 
traditionally happens in divided social science disciplines, hinders the understanding of the” 
associated issues that involve “finance, the economy, the welfare and politics”; (Walby, 2015). 
This chapter explains why the topic of this work is not an issue of economics alone as it touches 
almost all the spheres of the social system. Thus, my interest for the Dutch disease issue is not 
only the analysis of the paradox of plenty, but above all the fact that the Dutch disease issue is 
a rare topic that explicitly requires an analysis that does not isolate the economics from the 
politics. Accordingly, the topic of this work relaxes the ontological premise in economics that 
assumes the possibility of an isolated economic system in our social reality.  
As claimed by Aristotle, the social reality like any reality is made of structures and stuffs: 
Reality = Stuffs + Structures  (Holt, 2013). In order to avoid a complicated analysis, the social 
reality I have chosen to present is made of a set of stuffs and three main structures (the political, 
the economic and the legal structure).  
 
Figure 9. Simplified social reality. 
The biggest (green) circle represents the social reality with the three structures just mentioned. 
The white space between the three structures and the green circle represents the set of stuffs. 
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The economic structure can be accounted for as the institution of mutually beneficial exchange 
with money as the neutral means of exchange. As for the political structure, it is the institution 
of the government budget characterized in bulk by the decisions regarding the issue of “who 
gets what when and how” (Lasswell, 1936). Eventually, the legal structure loosely defines rules 
for the exchange system (i.e., the economic structure) and the political structure. The obvious 
and striking fact with this simplified social reality is that the three structures are not isolated 
from each other but rather overlap.  
Each of the three structures can by itself, without any doubt, be regarded at as a reality of its 
own, which is what happens in politics, economics, or specific social sciences. Thus to isolate 
the economic structure from the others, economics greatly relies on the ceteris paribus18 
assumption famous in scientific inquiries. “Economics is the study of how men and society 
chose, with or without the use of money could even think to employ scarce productive resource 
which could have alternative uses, to produce various commodities over time and distribute 
them for consumption, now and in the future among various people and groups of society”; 
(Samuelson, 2002). Applying the ceteris paribus assumption would consist in analysing the 
allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent from a purely economic point of view and setting as starting 
hypothesis that the Norwegian political and legal structures remain untouched. Such a reasoning 
is mostly found in the mainstream economics. Although a reasoning as the one in the 
mainstream economics can certainly allow the design of sophisticated and elevated economic 
models, the latter would be useless, as they will poorly connect to the reality (Finne, 2014). In 
fact, such a narrow perspective would fail to catch the political and legal dimensions that are 
not the least issues when it comes to the Norwegian oil revenues allocation. In other words, the 
consideration of these political and legal dimensions will provide a more realistic and therefore 
consistent analysis. Reasoning like a mainstream economist would imply for instance to focus 
on the efficiency of using the oil money less as it keeps the Dutch disease away from Norway, 
ignoring the political motives and consequences of such decision. However the perspective 
adopted in this analysis prevent the silo effect and therefore addresses the fact that there are 
other (possibly more serious) issues than economic efficiency related to the allocation of the 
Norwegian oil-rent. This is developed in the subsequent chapter. 
                                                 
18  The ceteris paribus assumption is the assumption that consists of holding all other 







Chapter V.THE FISCAL RULE: UNDERLYING CRITERIA AND 
ASSOCIATED OPPORTUNITY COSTS.  
The second chapter of this work describes what the Norwegian oil-rent is made up of and how 
it has been transferred into the Government Pension Fund Global – GPFG (SPU in Norwegian), 
where it is managed. The third chapter explains one of the incentives for the transfer of the oil 
revenues into the GPFG, namely the fear to incur the Dutch disease. The oil-rent is however 
not completely blocked in the GPFG but also allocated to the Norwegian citizens in a strictly 
monitored way via a guideline called the Budgetary Rule or the Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen 
in Norwegian). The current, fifth, chapter explains and illustrates via some examples how the 
Fiscal Rule works. Thus the first part of this chapter presents the underlying criteria selected 
for the Fiscal Rule (i.e., the allocation method of the oil-rent). The second part, then, highlights 
some empirical shortcoming outcomes of the allocation method chosen for the Norwegian oil-
rent that represents the Fiscal Rule.  
V.1. THE CRITERIA FOR THE ALLOCATION OF THE OIL-RENT DEFINED 
IN THE FISCAL RULE. 
The GPFG is a sovereign fund, and as such it generates returns. As the GPFG grew, a Budgetary 
Rule (or Fiscal Rule) regulating the management of the oil revenues was established in 2001. 
That Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) is the allocation method chosen by the 
Norwegian representatives for the allocation of the oil-rent. Methods of resource allocation are 
designed after criteria that reflect society values. These criteria are what, in economics, are 
referred to as preferences. In the case of the Norwegian oil-rent, the criteria chosen for the 
allocation method would stand for the preferences of the Norwegian citizens or different groups 
of Norwegian stakeholders. In fact these preferences correspond to “values” that are hopefully 
shared by most Norwegian citizens and, when used by Norwegian representatives to justify the 
chosen allocation method (i.e. the Fiscal Rule) for the oil-rent, will “preserve the moral 
foundations of social collaboration” (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 18). The Budgetary Rule 
relies on two main arguments; namely the productivity growth argument 
(produktivitetsvektsargumentet in Norwegian) and the savings- or distribution argument (spare- 
eller fordelingsargumentet in Norwegian). The analysis of these two arguments give an 
overview of the criteria selected in the allocation method decided for the Norwegian oil-rent. 
The subsequent subsections present these criteria. 
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V.1.1. The criterion of productivity 
In the Budgetary Rule, the productivity growth argument prescribes the allocation of the oil-
rent in a manner that will not adversely affect productivity in the different sectors of the 
Norwegian economy, and therefore in a manner that will preserve economic growth. 
Productivity is defined as the ratio between production (i.e. output) and use of inputs (or total 
factor input)19. Productivity growth is therefore observed when output grows faster than the 
total factor input. Put differently, productivity growth is the growth of output that is not 
attributable to the total factor input. There are many concepts of productivity that are used in 
different contexts. For instance, studies of the path for productivity gains can be based on labor 
productivity, while analyses of sources of economic growth require total factor productivity – 
TFP (or multi-factor productivity) that takes into account several additional inputs than only 
labor. The productivity concept addressed in the productivity growth argument of the 
Norwegian Budgetary Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) is the total factor productivity, 
which includes labor factor among the other factor inputs. Correspondingly, the productivity 
concept in the framework of this paper is actually the one used when analysing the sources of 
economic growth and it encompasses labor productivity (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, 2015, s. 
86).  
A broad range of factors drive productivity growth namely investments in physical capital, 
human capital, innovation, “competition in and regulation of domestic markets, as well as the 
degree of internationalization of the economy”. This shows that productivity growth is in fact 
a global process where different countries in different ways contribute to or benefit from the 
development of the source of global technology. For a small economy like Norway, the ability 
to adopt “forefront technology developed abroad” and to undertake structural restructuration 
(that promotes “high-productivity activities” at the expense of “low-productivity” activities) “is 
of decisive importance to productivity growth”. (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, 2015, ss. 14-44).  
 
 
                                                 
19 OutputProductivity ,   generally Input Labor &Capital
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The table that follows shows the move of the total factor productivity in Norway since 1970s.  
Table 6. Productivity growth. Percentage change from previous year20. 
 
 
The aftermath graph complements the table by presenting the position of Mainland-Norway in 
term of labor productivity, in comparison to those of Denmark, Germany, Sweden, France, and 
the USA.  
 
Translation:Mainland Norway (Fastlands-Norge); Denmark (Danmark). 
Germany (Tyskland); Sweden (Swerige);France (Frankrike); USA (USA). 
 
Figure 10. Growth of labor productivity since 1970. Index. 1970 = 100; Sources: OECD and Statistics 
Norway (Solberg & Finansdepartementet, 2014, s. 104). 
                                                 
20 1 Labour productivity is defined as value added per hour worked, while total factor 
productivity is defined as the portion of the change in the gross product which cannot be 
attributed to changes in the use of labor and capital formation. (Solberg & 
Finansdepartementet, 2014, s. 182). 2 Private industries in mainland Norway excluding 
housing, primary and electricity. 




Two aspects are put forward in the table. First, labor productivity appears to weight the most 
among the components of the Norwegian total factor productivity since the 1970s. The second 
point is that Mainland-Norway private industries contribute the most to the growth of total 
factor productivity since the start of Norwegian oil exploitation in the 1970s; (Statens 
Forvaltningstjeneste, 2015, ss. 14-16) & (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, 2015, s. 23). 
The criterion of productivity growth, obviously mentioned in the Fiscal Rule, belongs to the 
more general (and therefore quite abstract) criterion of efficiency (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978) 
frequently used when proceeding to resources allocation. The concept of economic efficiency 
corresponds to the outcome of an action or a policy whom benefits (or profits) exceed costs (or 
losses). Efficiency can thus be considered one of the criteria for the allocation of the Norwegian 
oil-rent insofar as the application of the productivity growth argument aims at sustaining the 
benefits and reducing the actions that entail losses. As the Dutch disease intensifies loses, a 
method of Norwegian oil-rent allocation that hinders the Dutch disease can be considered as 
productivity growth friendly, hence efficient. Accordingly, the efficiency criterion is applied 
through the productivity growth argument that prescribes the allocation of the oil-rent to social 
welfare on the one hand, and the allocation of the oil-rent to the drivers of productivity, on the 
other hand. The Fiscal Rule prescribes the use of an amount (i.e. up to 4%) of expected the 
return to investment on the (sovereign) oil fund. This method of allocation of the oil-rent (i.e. 
the Fiscal Rule) dampens the adverse fallouts of the Dutch disease spending effect. For this 
reason, efficiency is via the productivity growth argument, one of the Fiscal Rule criteria. In 
this work, I consequently assume that a productivity growth-oriented resource allocation 
method can be more generally named an efficiency-oriented resource allocation method. That 
is why for simplicity reason and because I resort to Calabresi & Bobbitt writings on resource 
allocation and tragic choices, I just call the criterion of productivity growth, the criterion of 
efficiency. An efficient method of Norwegian oil-rent allocation should thus provide social 
welfare without skipping the drivers of productivity growth cited above. The case-study of the 
Netherlands experience of the Dutch disease reveals the imbalance in the allocation of the gas-
rent between the social welfare and the investment for the promotion of productivity growth. 
As mentioned in the second part of chapter four, the inflow of gas revenues has caused the 
appreciation of the Dutch Guilder and the loss of competitiveness in the other tradable sectors 
of the Dutch economy. As a result, the Dutch government transferred more gas-rent to social 
programs (such as unemployment benefits) in order to solve social consequences of economic 
slowdown, instead of investing in productivity growth drivers. Stagflation, eventually, took 
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over when the gas revenues began to go down. All this emphasizes and explains the relevance 
of the productivity growth criterion (or efficiency criterion) in the allocation method chosen for 
the Norwegian oil-rent (i.e. the Fiscal Rule). Norway, aware of Dutch experience, selected 
productivity growth (and more generally efficiency) as one of the criteria assumed to guide the 
redistribution method for the oil-rent. The next section presents the second criterion considered 
in the Fiscal Rule. 
 
V.1.2. The criterion of equality 
A fundamental issue that arises when faced with the challenge of allotting a scarce resource is 
the concern for justice (called equity or equality in the scope of this paper, taking the two to be 
synonymous). The political economy has borrowed from the Theory of Justice two dominant 
approaches for an equitable allocation of resources. These approaches are the additive-welfare 
approach and the Rawlsian “max-min” approach (Solow, 1974). The additive-welfare 
approach (also called the sum-of-utilities criterion) relies on an interpersonal “cardinal utility 
function  i iU c , where ic  is the consumption of the i th individual”. An equitable or just 
resource allocation in this theory is the one that maximizes the sum of all these interpersonal 






 , where ic “are constrained by technology, 
initial resources, and informational and other difficulties in transferring goods among 
individuals” (Arrow, 1973). A weakness of the additive-welfare approach lies in the fact that 
it fails to reduce inequality and therefore can lead to an inequity allocation, hence the 
consideration of the Rawlsian approach. 
In the Rawlsian max-min approach, an equitable or just resource allocation is the one that 
maximizes the utility of the “least well-off member of the society”, which is equally function 
of 
ic , the consumption as previously constrained by “technology, initial resources, and 
informational and other difficulties in transferring goods among individuals” (Arrow, 1973). 
That is:   i i
i
Max min U c 
 
. This approach seems to satisfy more the need of an equitable 




An additional issue is the time dimension. Specifically the issue of fairness in resource 
allocation can concern on the one hand individuals of the same generation (i.e., 
intragenerational equity), and on the other hand it can concern individuals of a generation 
relative to individuals of other generations, generally future generations, (i.e., intergenerational 
equity). Thus this part explains how, via its savings- or distribution argument (in Norwegian 
Spare- eller fordelingsargumentet), the Budgetary Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) 
reveals a certain willingness for intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity 
regarding the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent. This said, there are two level of equality 
concern expressed in the Fiscal Rule that are successively presented in the following 
subsections. 
 Equality among the present generation of citizens. 
The Norwegian oil-rent is allocated to the present generation of citizens via the Government 
budget. Indeed, a purpose of the Budgetary Rule21 (made of the productivity growth argument 
and the savings- or distribution argument) is, among others, to equalize the welfare of the 
Norwegian citizens, by financing (by up to 4% of the return to the oil fund investment) the 
government budget deficit. The two following tables provide an insight into how the Norwegian 
oil-rent is “indirectly” redistributed via the different accounts of the government budget. 
“Indirectly” in the sense that it is the deficit of the government budget that is financed by the 
oil fund (i.e., the Government Pension Fund Global).The first table depicts the main accounts 
of 2013 Norwegian government budget, while the second table details the account “Transfers 
to private citizens” of the first table. 
Table 7. The spending in the Norwegian government 2013's budget. 
 
                                                 





Amounts in NOK million Bud. 2013 % of Tot. Private % of Grand tot. % of the Tot. Social Security 
Social Security, sick leave 37 660 6,2% 3,5% 10,2% 
Social Security, pensions 162 208 26,5% 15,2% 44,0% 
Social Security, other purpose 113 958 18,6% 10,7% 30,9% 
Social Security, health services 25 086 4,1% 2,4% 6,8% 
Social Security, employment related 12 070 2,0% 1,1% 3,3% 
Social Security, contributions to parents 18 063 3,0% 1,7% 4,9% 
Other pensions 3 111 0,5% 0,3%  
Regional health service institutions 111 951 18,3% 10,5%  
Allowance for children support 14 985 2,5% 1,4%  
Cash allowance 878 0,1% 0,1%  
Agriculture deal 12 774 2,1% 1,2%  
Development aid 26 312 4,3% 2,5%  
Cultural purposes 6 586 1,1% 0,6%  
Employment measures 8 961 1,5% 0,8%  
Education support 5 247 0,9% 0,5%  
Research 4 451 0,7% 0,4%  
Home, living environment and buildings 4 115 0,7% 0,4%  
Private schools and higher education 5 191 0,8% 0,5%  
Costs of transport services 4 893 0,8% 0.5%  
EEA finance agreements 1 897 0,3% 0,2%  
Interest, domestic government debt 12 800 2,1% 1,2%  
Other transfers  18 233 3,0% 1,7%  
Sum transfers to private 611 430 100% 57,4%  
Grand total structural non-oil budget 1 064 869  100% 100% 
Total Social Security costs 369 045 60,4% 34,7%  
 
This second table is mostly made of components that are addressed in bulk as social welfare in 
this paper and whose consumption provides the utility of the least well-off [i.e.   i i
i
min U c ] 
that is maximized in the Rawlsian max-min approach:   i i
i
Max min U c 
 
. Norway is, a 
propos, globally recognized as one of the most “egalitarian society”. The equality in question 
here is not the willingness to have all the citizens acquire the same social and economic position, 
but the willingness to provide equal chances to the less favoured in the society. This shows that 
                                                 





the essence of the social welfare is to reduce inequality by providing ‘equal chances’ to the 
citizens poorly endowed by the state of affairs. In this respect, the allocation method for the oil-
rent (that is, the Norwegian Budgetary Rule) abides more to the Rawlsian max-min approach 
than to the “additive-welfare approach”. 
In conclusion, this part explains, through the Rawlsian max-min approach, how the Budgetary 
Rule, which is the method of allocation for the oil-rent, is, among others, based on the criterion 
of equity among the present generation of citizens. The next part completes this part with, this 
time, the criterion of equality between the current and the future generation of citizens.  
 Intergenerational equity or equality between the present and 
the future generation of citizens. 
The savings- or distribution argument (in Norwegian Spare- eller fordelingsargumentet) of the 
Budgetary Rule23 prescribes the use of the oil-rent in a way that considers, in addition to the 
welfare of the present generation, the welfare of the future generation of citizens. This implies 
that the future generation of citizens should benefit also from the oil-rent even when the oil 
reserves are exhausted. Thus, unlike the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent to the present 
generation of citizens that goes through the government budget, the allocation between the 
current and the future generation of citizens goes through the GPFG (that is the Norwegian 
sovereign oil fund). In fact, the intergenerational equity is only implementable through 
“productive” resources (Arrow, 1973, s. 324). About this, the GPFG – being a sovereign fund 
– is a productive resource. “In a model with exhaustible resources, Solow [1974] has interpreted 
intergenerational equity to mean equal consumption per capita at each date” (Dasgupta & Mitra, 
1983). Productive resource is essential when seeking for intergenerational equity in resource 
allocation insofar as it is the only way to ensure the constancy of “the time path of current output 
and current consumption per head” (Hartwick, 1977, s. 972). Such state is referred to as an 
“efficient equitable path” (Dasgupta & Mitra, 1983, s. 133). None of the models analyzed by 
these economists considers sovereign funds as the productive resources mentioned but 
investment in “machines” for instance. This points to the fact that the findings of these models 
are more or less different from their implementation to the case of Norway, where the oil-rent 
has been converted into a sovereign fund. For the moment, this part does not discuss whether 
the Budgetary Rule has led the Norwegian economy to the “efficient equitable path”, which 
                                                 
23 Budgetary Rule or Fiscal Rule. 
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will be addressed later. The aim of this part is solely to highlight that the Budgetary Rule reveals 
a willingness for intergenerational equity and how the economic literature describes the 
mechanism that permits to reach intergenerational equity. The section that comes next deals 
with the third underlying criterion in the Fiscal Rule.  
V.1.3. The criterion of honesty 
Honesty is the more latent but far from the least important criterion when proceeding to the 
allocation of scarce resources. In political economy, honesty is expressed through transparency, 
that is, the release of “timely and reliable economic, social and political information accessible 
to all relevant stakeholders” (Bellver & Kaufmann (2005) in (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009)). By 
“holding out the promise of efficiency while building credibility, trust and collaboration, 
transparency has become a popular leadership style”. Accordingly, “transparency has been 
adopted as a policy and potent management tool in public and private sectors” (Drucker & 
Gumpert, 2007). Thus despite the fact that the criterion of honesty (or transparency) is not 
obviously revealed in the two arguments of the Fiscal Rule, it is an implicit value (or 
preference), on which Norwegian citizens and representatives base their relationship. In the 
resource curse literature, the good quality of Norwegian institutions is countlessly quoted as a 
key factor of the Norwegian economic performance. This good quality of institution comes 
from the trust politicians has gained from the citizens thanks to their transparent political 
behavior.  
Confidence is the society glue and fuel. Trust (or equally reliance, or confidence) is based on 
recognition, social equality, […] balance between employers and unions, high degree of 
redistribution through taxes, and active fight of social disparities24. Systems based on trust 
wastes little energy in “suspicion- frictional heat” through “excessive use and abuse of rules” 
and control. Trust is therefore not only an input for the promotion of life quality but also an 
input for value creation. Trust is Norwegian citizens’ premier social capital (Hessen, 2015, s. 
18). Trust however does not go without honesty (or transparency). Indeed, one can hardly 
believe that Norwegian citizens would trust their institutions, if they did not assume their 
politicians and the managers of these institutions were honest (or transparent). The story of the 
Norwegian Oil Fund -and Norwegian oil history more generally- is fundamentally a story of 
                                                 




trust: voters have trust in politicians, politicians have trust in each other across party lines- and 
they have trust in bureaucrats, who have trust in institutions. And all of them have shown that 
they have been trust worthy; (Skredderberget, 2015, s. 100). 
In the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent, dishonesty (or a sort of subtle opacity) would be the 
fact of hiding others criteria that have counted when choosing the Fiscal Rule as the allocation 
method for the oil-rent. The transparency about the size of the oil fund, its governance and 
management is not of great interest in this work, as Norway ranks among the most transparent 
countries worldwide concerning those aspects. Therefore the focus of this paper remains on the 
transparency regarding the criteria (or preferences) expressed for the oil-rent allocation in the 
Norwegian Fiscal Rule. This third criterion is the key issue of this work insofar as Norwegian 
politicians seem to be less than franc about the criteria chosen as justifications for the method 
of oil-rent allocation (or equally the Fiscal Rule). In fact, they officially present the scarcity 
associated to the oil resource and show big concern for intergenerational equity to justify the 
allocation of the oil proceeds that gradually entails social welfare cuts via some reforms. 
Furthermore, they use dubious bearish statistics in order to emphasize that either the oil resource 
contributes weakly to the national income or the exhaustion of oil reserves is imminent. Though 
this political ploy aims at highlighting the scarcity of the oil resource, there is a gap between 
the scarcity Norwegian politician displayed and the other scarcity that guides their policies 
about the allocation of the oil-rent. That other scarcity is the absorptive capacity of the oil-rent 
that Norway has due to the smallness of its population size relative to the size of the 
accumulated oil-rent. Politicians’ choices about the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent (and 
the provision of welfare services) seem to be silently but greatly driven by the fear of the Dutch 
disease. Hiding that fact and pretending that it is the scarcity of the oil-rent that drives the Fiscal 
Rule breaches the principle of transparency, turns the Fiscal Rule into a tragic choice and 
therefore may damage the Norwegian institutions over time by inducing citizens’ distrust 
towards politicians. The problem with trust and credibility is that they can growth and 
productivity in a way that cannot be measured as an undetectable poison. This point will be 
analysed in details and illustrated in the following subsection. 
 The dynamics that turns a method of scarce resource 
allocation to a tragic choice. 
Any method of resource allocation contents opportunity costs brought about by the relative 
scarcity of that resource. Because of the relative scarcity of that resource, some criteria that 
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prescribe ‘who can get what how and when’ have to be determined as justification to the 
allocation method chosen. The alternative combinations of these criteria or the different 
possible dosages of these criteria result in different possible methods of allocation for the scarce 
resource considered. Every alternative allocation method has its opportunity cost that can be 
expressed via the rationing of the resource to a certain category of individuals, which for 
instance may incur a degradation of their welfare. As long as the allocation managers are 
transparent (or honest) about the selected criteria, the opportunity costs incurred by the citizens 
(and that degrade their lives or welfare) will be considered “merely a fatal misfortune”. 
However, if it comes out to the public that the allocation managers failed to account all the 
criteria that define the allocation method chosen (e.g. the Fiscal Rule), then the associated 
opportunity costs will be unacceptable for the citizens and the method of allocation (here the 
Fiscal Rule) “perceived as a tragic” method of oil-rent allocation. For this reason transparency 
“is more than the instrument, it is measurement itself, of a resource allocation method” 
(Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978). In fact, transparency is at the same time a neutral criterion of 
allocation just as “efficiency” and “equality”, and a criterion that enables to evaluate the 
decisions made by the politicians concerning the method of oil-rent allocation. A complete 
information about the criteria of allocation enables us to have the overview of substitutable 
alternative methods and their associated opportunity costs. Without transparency (or with a 
biased transparency, or with a subtle opacity), it is no more possible to correctly evaluate the 
alternative methods of resource allocation, which leads to situations of absolute scarcity that is 
neither the scope of economics nor of tragic choices. Furthermore, in absence of transparency 
or in a situation of biased transparency, even if the chosen method of resource allocation by the 
politicians has the lowest possible opportunity costs, these opportunity costs will be painful for 
the citizens due the breach in the criterion of honesty (or transparency). 
The remainder of this chapter investigates whether the Fiscal Rule is a tragic choice. It presents 
challenges encountered in the implementation of the Fiscal Rule that is the redistribution 
method chosen for the Norwegian oil-rent. In fact this part is an inquiry into the transparency 
regarding the criteria defined for the Fiscal Rule. We will analyse (through some empirical 
examples) whether there are some contractions or puzzles regarding the information released 
by the Norwegian politicians when they are to use the oil-rent to finance the government budget. 
More specifically, are there some hidden additional criteria that implicitly bound or constraint 




V.2. IS THE FISCAL RULE A TRAGIC CHOICE? 
As already mentioned, the method of allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent is called the 
Budgetary Rule or Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) and it has been introduced in 
2001 by the First Cabinet Stoltenberg. The Budgetary Rule or Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen 
in Norwegian) specifies the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent to the citizens via the 
government budget and to use the expected real return on the oil fund up to an estimated rate 
of 4 percent. This means that the Norwegian government budget can be made up with a non-oil 
deficit equivalent to this return (4%). The Budgetary Rule emphasizes, however, that the use of 
petroleum revenues in a given year can differ from this guideline, but over time there will be a 
correlation between the use of income and return of the fund. It is the deficit which determines 
how much money must be transferred from the oil fund to the government budget. A broad 
majority in the Parliament agreed with the Budgetary Rule. Thus, the Government Pension 
Fund Global- GPFG (i.e. the oil fund) is to build long-term objectives using petroleum 
revenues. The Budgetary Rule guarantees a management of public expenditure that has 
maintained the Norwegian government budget in a sustainable state. However, complying with 
the Budgetary Rule seems to affect the provision of welfare for the present generation, owe to 
some measures of fiscal consolidations undertaken by the Norwegian government: Indeed, the 
real rate of return is measured by time (per year) may be considered as payment through the 
present generation for postponing the consumption of the capital, which surely means that the 
present generation has a very strong claim on the real return while keeping the capital for future 
generation. 
“Discretionary fiscal consolidation measures”, that erode the welfare of the present generation 
of Norwegian citizens, are implemented through either “tax increase” or “cuts in social welfare 
programs and pensions” (Barry & Elizabeth, 2014). As for the choice of “spending cuts” rather 
than “tax hikes” the reasons are that some researchers have showed that “tax increases were 
more harmful to economic growth (Leigh et al. (2010)” and less “effective than spending cuts 
“in making consolidation successful” (Larch and Turrini (2008). Moreover, Barry & Elizabeth 
(2014) emphasize that tax hikes tend to work better in countries with low levels of tax, hence 
the opting for spending cuts in Norway where the tax levels are already quite high (Barry & 
Elizabeth, 2014). Theses “discretionary fiscal consolidation measures” may either aim at 
“correcting past conditions”, reducing “government deficits and debt accumulation” or 
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“enhancing economic growth” (Barry & Elizabeth, 2014). In addition, “the traditional 
Keynesian view proposes that fiscal consolidation policies be reserved for times of economic 
expansion, while policies of increased spending and lower taxes should be implemented during 
recessions” (Barry & Elizabeth, 2014). Since the 2008 financial crisis, fiscal consolidation 
measures have taken over public debate especially in OECD countries that underwent economic 
slowdown or crisis. Norway has essentially been spared by that crisis, what makes it hard for 
an ordinary citizen to give credit to any argument by the government to justify these fiscal 
consolidation measures. 
The Budgetary Rule prescribes that the use of the Norwegian oil-rent should not block the 
productivity growth on the one hand, and on the other hand it should preserve the welfare of 
both the present generation and the future generation of Norwegian citizens. So far, the 
Norwegian government has succeeded in protecting the productivity growth and saving the oil-
rent for the future generations. As for the welfare of the present generation, there are some 
puzzling aspects to highlight. The puzzling aspects this work addresses correspond to the 
method chosen for the allocation of the oil-rent (i.e. the Fiscal Rule) and that induces the 
degradation of “life or its correlative well-being” through “suffering and death”; (Calabresi & 
Bobbitt, 1978). Two examples are used to illustrate fiscal consolidation measures undertaken 
by the Norwegian politicians: the pension cuts reform and the rationing in some health 
spending. The case-study of the rationing of welfare services, gains credibility due to the trend 
of politicians to minimize the economic value of the natural resources in general and the oil 
more specifically. This fact is thus illustrated before exposing the two examples of welfare 
services rationing.  
 
V.2.1. The Under-evaluation of oil resource to value creation in 
Norway. 
 
 The Norwegian politicians’ tradition of undervaluing the 
natural capital. 
The Norwegian Department of Finance released a report (in “Perspektivmelding”) that shows 
the contribution to the national income of the different types of capital (e.g. human capital, 
natural resource capital, real capital, and financial capital). Flåten (2013, ss. 4-10) has looked 
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at the report as well as the computational methods used and found some inconsistencies 
regarding the figures released on human capital and natural resource capital especially. More 
precisely, he finds out that the computational methods used by the Norwegian Department of 
Finance leads to the undervaluation of natural capital (i.e. the capital that is not associated to 
any ownership) and the overvaluation of human capital (i.e. the economic value of labor and 
human knowledge) in value creation in Norway. The figures were (as shown in the following 
diagrams) that the contribution of human capital to the national income would amount to 81% 
while the one of natural capital would be of only 4%. 
 
 
Figure 11. National income repartition as it is presented by the Norwegian Finance Department (in 
“Perspektivmeldingen) and by the Norwegian Statistics Agency (i.e. Statistisk Sentralbyrå); (Flåten, 2013, s. 
5). 
 
When Flåten then checks the same figures from the Norwegian agency of statistics (Statistisk 
sentralbyrå – SSB in Norwegian), he finds slight differences; namely that the contribution of 
human capital to the national income would amount to 71% while the one of natural capital 
would be of 11%. Abstracting away from the different magnitude of the figures, the conclusions 
from either the Finance Department or the Statistics agency converge; that is, the human capital 
would contribute the most to the Norwegian national income. Flåten analyses in his article the 
valuation method of each variable used by either the Norwegian Finance Department or SSB, 
then he makes the same valuation but by replicating the twofold Danish method25 made up of 
the costs method (called method A) and the income method (called method B), see Appendix 6 
for more explanation. The following table summarizes his findings: the most striking point is 
that human capital is certainly the type of capital that contributes the most to the national income 
                                                 
25  In 2012 the Danish economic council (that releases every year a report on the 
development of the Danish economy) made a comprehensive analysis on, among others, 
real savings, human capital, physical capital, oil, gas, financial capital, air pollution, timber, 
fishery, and groundwater (see “De Økonomisk Råd, 2012” for more details). 
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but far less than the statement from the Norwegian Finance Department 
(“Perspektivemelding”). 
Table 8. The two alternative calculations of human capital and natural capital contribution to national 
product. 
 The Norwegian evaluation methods The Danish evaluation methods replicated by Flåten. 





Human Capital 81% of 2010’s national income. 71% of 2011’s national income. 37.3% 66.2% 
Natural Capital 4% of 2010’s national income. 11% of 2011’s national income. 25.6% 13.8% 
Real capital   27.7% 14.9% 
Financial Capital   9.4% 5.1% 
National wealth   25 409 318 (100%) 47 126 067 (100%) 
 
Flåten’s article addresses the central political economy questions of which factors drive the 
Norwegian economy. More precisely, he inquires the method of computation that brought about 
the figures used by Norwegian politicians to state that labor was the key factor of Norway 
economic performance. But such statement seems confusing when the Norwegian economy is 
compared to the Swedish or Danish economy, which shows almost the same features except for 
the endowment in natural resources that entails economic rent: for instance, since the boom in 
the Norwegian energy sector, for the same type of professional position, wage in Norway is far 
higher than the ones in Sweden and in Denmark. Furthermore, the Norwegian GDP per 
inhabitant is 74% over the OECD average (see the following graph, Fig. 11). If Norway 
performs economically better than the other countries that share almost the same economic 
features except for the endowment in natural capital, then the Norwegian difference is 




Figure 12. GDP per capita for Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 1970-2011, 2005 prices, CCP basis in USD. 
Source: OECD and Cappelen and Mjøset (2012). 
The impressive Norwegian economic performance would be, according to Flåten, attributable 
to a shielding wage or a hidden economic rent that is in fact generated by the energy sector (or 
more generally by the natural resources) but is not included by government experts in the natural 
capital. Flåten (2013) does not deny the important contribution of labor (through human capital) 
to the Norwegian economy, but his point is that the method used by the Norwegian department 
of finance and the SSB tends to undervalue the contribution of natural capital. All in all, Flåten’s 
article points at the issue of transparency regarding the contribution of the Norwegian energy 
sector to the economy. Dubious transparency is actually comparable to a subtle opacity. Such 
politicians’ position could lead to wrong policies, such as a poor the management of natural 
resources and – coming back to the topic of this work – to a questionable allocation of 
Norwegian resources like the oil-rent (or GPFG). Specifically considering that the natural 
capital contributes very little to the national income would tend to orient budget policy towards 
spending cuts. 
The subsection that comes next pursuits the illustration of the Norwegian government trend to 
underweight the position of natural resources (and thus of oil) in the national added value. 
 
 SSB’s data on Norwegian oil reserves assessment. 
Many fiscal consolidation measures enacted in Norway are supported by computations using 
data released by the Norwegian statistics agency (Statistisk Sentralbyrå-SSB in Norwegian). 
For example the Norwegian pension commission resorted to data by the SSB on the oil reserves 
to come out with the idea of the need for pension cuts. The SSB produces its own data but also 
                                                 
26 Translation: Danmark=Denmark, Norge=Norway, Sverige=Sweden. 
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collects data from others specialized institutions such as the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
– NPD (Oljedirektoratet in Norwegian) in charge of producing figures like quantity of reserves 
for example. In this process of collecting data from other institutions, it happens that the SSB 
sometimes behaves strangely. This is the object of Osmundsen’s (2015) analysis of the 
projected decline in oil revenues (mostly caused by the foreseen exhaustion of oil reserves), 
which is part of SSB released data.   
According to Osmundsen (2015) data released by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate – NPD, 
if used minutely leads to a more positive forecast of oil reserves, and therefore of expected oil 
revenues. In 2000, the NPD estimates 13.8 billion standard cubic meters of oil and gas reserves. 
In 2015, this figure is revised up to 14.1 billion cubic meters. This increase is due to advance 
in technology that facilitates the discovery of new fields. Thus the Sverdrup field in the north 
shelf, the Castberg field, the Pil and Bue field, the Alta-Gotha field are examples of new 
reserves discovered after the NPD 2000’s estimates. For this reason, the NPD proceeds 
periodically to an adjustment of its projections.  What Osmundsen (2015) notices in his article, 
is that government works continue to rely on decreasing forecasts of oil reserves because they 
just focus on the fact that the NPD makes long-term projections and thereby overlook the 
meantime adjustments. About this, the Norwegian statistics agency (Statistisk Sentralbyrå-SSB 
in Norwegian) produced a (2013) report, for the Holden- committee (Holden-utvalget in 
Norwegian) and the Rattsø- committee (Rattsø-utvalget in Norwegian), that used the NPD 
2000’s estimates without considering the following upgrades. Thought the leader in the research 
department of the SSB, Å. Cappelen, does not deny Osmundsen (2015) findings, he insures 
however that it was not for purpose. All the same, Osmundsen (2015) point is that the SSB 
report once again joints the trend for government agencies to produce document where the 
natural resources and their contribution to wealth creation are underestimated. (Regjeringen 
mangler faglig grunnlag for sine pessimistiske prognoser for Norges olje- og gassreserver, 
2015, s. 27) & (Professor hudfletter oljedommedagsprofeter, 2015, s. 5). This estimation seems 
to indicate that as a rule, when it comes to natural resources (and particularly oil). Parameters 
in the pension reform seems to indicate the same impression that the government tends to 
systematically “play down” the enormous oil revenues.  
One of the consequences of such trend of undervaluing the future reserves and revenues of oil 
is a reduced allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent to present generation of citizens and hence the 
cut in the provision of social welfare services. The coming sections illustrate via two instances 




 The State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) and public 
dependence on energy booming sector. 
The second chapter presented among others, the different ways, the Norwegian government get 
revenues from the oil booming sector. One of these ways where through State’s Direct Financial 
Interest (SDFI) that is the Norwegian government's directly owned (via Petoro 80%, Statoil 
15% and Norsk Hydro 5%) exploration and production licenses for petroleum and natural gas 
on the Norwegian continental shelf. In fact, the management of 50 % of state’s exploration and 
production licenses were initially (i.e. 1973-1985) assigned to Statoil that was then a public 
company. In 1985, the SDFI is created (after 1984 SDFI-reform) and granted 80% of state’s 
exploration and production licenses and 20% left to Statoil. The partial privatization of Statoil 
led to the creation of the public Petoro in charge of the management of 80% of the SDFI, while 
15% were left to Statoil and 5% to Norsk Hydro. This state’s ownership highlights an alternative 
allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent that is most of the time overlooked. Indeed through SDFI, 
a part of the oil revenues is invested in the oil booming sector and thereby expensed. The SDFI 
subtly veils the whole view of oil revenues. One of the consequences of that operation is, as 
highlighted by the former Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch (2000, s. 14), that the parliament is 
really aware of not all but part of the oil-revenue. This constitutes an incentive for reform in the 
direction of fiscal consolidations.  
Willoch (2000) goes on in his article to point out that the veiling of the oil incomes “put a break” 
on the ease that grip the parliamentarians when confronted with a big income stream”. The 
investment in SDFI becomes a part of oil-rent that is not so visible”. Willoch’s statement only 
shows the length of the tradition of veiling the oil income. 
 
V.2.2. The pension reform 
The Norwegian pension scheme (just as the Norwegian welfare model more generally) is based 
on the solidarity among groups of citizens at various events and stages in life, and on the 
solidarity between generations. This mechanism of solidarity is managed via the government 
budget and other institutional arrangements like the government pension fund Norway-GPFN 
(Statens pensjonsfond Norge –SPN in Norwegian), the government pension fund Global-
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GPFG27 (Statens pensjonsfond utland- SPU in Norwegian), and so on… In 2011 a pension 
reform that goes in the direction of fiscal consolidation measures has been enacted and justified 
by the fact that the Norwegian pension scheme is projected to face some challenges in the 
coming years due to the strong increase in the number of elderly whose care will require a 
greater share of national wealth and due to the projection of declining oil reserves. Indeed there 
would be around 800000-900000 pensioners in Norway nowadays, which represents almost 2.6 
workers per pensioner. In 1967, there were around 3.9 workers per pensioner. This number is 
projected to fall to 1.6 workers per pensioner in 2050 (Finansdepartement D. K., 2004-2005, s. 
4), as sketch in the following: 
 
 
Figure 13. Number of labor per pensioner. 
In addition, as seen in the third chapter devoted to the understanding of the Dutch disease, one 
of the consequences of the boom in the Norwegian oil sector is the substantial rise of real wage. 
This calls for the adjustment of pension payment to real wage in order to preserve the 
purchasing power of pensioners. All things considered, pension liabilities are thereby expected 
to rise, while oil revenues are expected to decline as displays the following figure: 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 14 National Insurance spending on old age and disability, the government’s net Cash flow from 
activities and disposable petroleum revenues after the Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian); Percent 
of GDP for mainland Norway. (Finansdepartment, 2004-2005, s. 33) 
 
The above figure summarizes one of the forecasts used by the pension commission to convince 
on the necessity of a pension reform. One can see that pension spending for old age and 
disability is expected to reach around 21% of mainland Norway GDP by 2060, while the 
Government net cash flow and the Disposable petroleum revenues after Fiscal Rule are 
expected to fall, respectively to around 0 and 5% of mainland Norway GDP by 2060. 
The pension reform implemented, is a long-term and comprehensive social and economic 
policy, which purpose would be to prevent conflicts between generations regarding the 
distribution of benefits and burdens on the one hand, and on the other hand to sustain the 
potential growth of national wealth creation. The measures taken for the pension reform are so 
extensive that they go far beyond the scope of this work which focus is more issues related to 
the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent. Among these measures, the funding of pension, in 
particular, falls within the scope of this work as the funding of the reformed Norwegian pension 
harnesses the Norwegian oil fund (GPFG). 
The Norwegian pension commission had two alternatives as for the funding of pension. The 
first was the establishment of a broad (or macro) fund that would reflect both the government 
petroleum revenues and the evolution in the pension liabilities. The second was the 
establishment of a more insurance-based fund that directly would focus more on the extent of 
pension liabilities. This second alternative would require, all the same, the establishment of a 
modified petroleum fund in order to amortize fluctuations in petroleum revenues, foreign 
exchange rates and fund performance. The first alternative has then been chosen for the pension 
reform, with the establishment of a “macro” fund called Government Pension Fund (Statens 
Pensjonsfond in Norwegian). The Government Pension Fund is made of two components: the 
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Government Pension Fund Norway -GPFN (for investment inside Norway) is managed by the 
Norwegian National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygdfond in Norwegian) and it amounts to 186 
billion 2015-Crowns; besides, the Government Pension Fund Global -GPFG (for investment 
abroad) is managed by the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank in Norwegian), and it 
amounts to 6431 billion 2015-Crowns. It follows that the management of the reformed pension 
– via that “macro” Government Pension Fund – takes into consideration the nexus between 
pension liabilities and economic long term challenges (Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, 2004, ss. 
30-31). Because of the new interconnection between the pension fund (GPFN and GPFG) and 
the government budget, the computations made to assess the requirement for pension funding 
relies on assumptions made on changes in the reference path of variables like oil price, 
population growth, and labour… Such changes affect at the same time the GPFG and the 
government budget balance, hence the GPFN. In long-term project like pension reform, the 
consideration of changes in parameter values over time is of great importance for the robustness 
of computations over time. The parameters attention is drawn at in this section are the oil price, 
the discount rate, the labor per pensioner. This section brings light only on some aspects of 
computations made to justify the new arrangements that frame the redistribution of pensions 
(Statens Forvaltningstjeneste, 2004), and highlights the implications for the allocation of the 
Norwegian oil-rent.  
 
 The discount rate of pension unfunded liabilities. 
This subsection is another way to indicate how the politicians deliberately use parameters 
values to urge to believe that fiscal consolidations measures are needed for the Norwegian 
pension. The value of discount rate plays a critical role in the projections of pension liabilities: 
an understated discount rate entails overstated pension liabilities and fiscal consolidations 
measures for the present generation of citizens while an overstated discount rate entails 
understated pension liabilities and fiscal consolidations measures for the future generation of 
citizens. (Ralfe, 2011). Specifically, the choice of a low discount rate for the unfunded pension 
liabilities leads to a substantial drop in the fund ratio, which can be seen as a problem of 
solvency for the pension scheme. As a result, either more contributions are going to be asked 
to present taxpayers, or cuts in present pension benefits are going to be undertaken in order to 
have the fund ratio back to a solvent level. (Pattison, 2012). This implies allocating less the 
Norwegian oil-rent to the present generation of citizens. 
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The problem is that “it is unclear what an accurate discount rate should be”. Discount rates “do 
not truly reflect the expected risk-free returns” as they can arbitrary be suddenly adjusted 
upwards or downwards by central banks. “For instance […] Denmark and Sweden took direct 
approaches, setting floors or specific values for the discount rates applicable to certain 
obligations” in order to alleviate pension burden on present citizens.  (Pozen & Hamacher, 
2012).  
In Norway, the 2004 pension commission has rather been careful and have not explicitly 
mention the discount rate used, which is indirectly mentioned on the footnote of the St. Meld. 
Nr. 5 2006-2007 document at the page 26, and it seems to be somewhere around 2%. However, 
referring to the Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) the long term expected return in 
financial investment is assessed to be 4%. The question is then why did the pension commission 
not use the 4%. The suspicion is of course that with a 4% discount rate, no pension deficit would 
appear even with a 140 2003-Crowns estimated oil price. So consistency should demand that, 
in line with the Fiscal Rule, the 4% constitute a discount rate for future pension viability. But 
as usual, one is faced with the pension commission (and thus politicians) silence in case where 
parameters entail an optimistic forecast of public finance.  
The subsequent subsection presents another questionable parameter used by the pension 
commission namely the estimation of labour per pensioner. 
 The oil-price. 
For a given or projected level of pension liabilities, a high oil price is expected to have a positive 
effect on pension solvency, as high oil price increases the government revenues from oil 
exploitation. Inversely, a low oil price means less government revenues for a given level of 
projected pension liabilities, hence expected solvency problem in pension scheme.  
The long-term oil price used in the computation of pension reform is 140 2003-crowns per 
barrel, which amounts to around 22.79 2003-USD per barrels (Finansdepartement D. K., 2004-
2005, s. 14). Over time that price, chosen as the main hypothesis for the projection of pension 
finances, appears quite low even at the time (2004). However, the oil price is maintained in the 
low level of this main hypothesis. According to the pension commission, even the consideration 
of a higher price would not succeed in cancelling the long-term funding requirement for public 
sector; the sustainability of The Norwegian National Insurance Scheme should not be based on 
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high oil price, and because the experience from 1970-1980s would show that it is much harder 
to correct the exchange rate if it turns out that the oil price will be lower than expected, than if 
it is higher (Finansdepartement D. K., 2004-2005, s. 8). The following simulation example has 
been provided as a support to this statement: 50 Crowns higher oil price than the main 
hypothesis of 140 2003-crowns per barrel would remove around one fifth of the funding 
requirement for the public sector. Under the assumptions of such moderate changes of oil price, 
the two following figures put forward the projected outcomes for public finances (including 
pension fund): 
 
Figure 13. Unmet funding requirements of public finances in relation to 2003 under different assumptions of 
the price. Percent of GDP for mainland – Norway. (Finansdepartement, 2004-2005, s. 9). 
Figure 15 shows that under the main hypothesis of an oil price of 180 2003-Crowns per barrel, 
the public finances (including the pension fund) are expected to record a deficit of about 8% of 
Mainland Norway GDP in 2069. That deficit falls around 7% of Mainland Norway GDP when 
considering the hypothesis of a higher oil price of 230 2003-Crowns per barrel and reach around 
10% of Mainland Norway GDP when considering the hypothesis of a lower oil price of 130 
2003-Crowns per barrel. The next figure presents the balance of the state budget including the 
oil fund with various paths of oil price. 
 
Figure 14. The balance of state budget including the Petroleum Fund with various oil price paths. Percent of 




One sees that under the main hypothesis of an oil price of 140 2003-Crowns per barrel, the 
public finances (including the pension fund) are expected to record a deficit from around 2030. 
That deficit is reached from around 2045 when considering the hypothesis of a higher oil price 
of 180 2003-Crowns per barrel and would start permanently from around 2010 under the 
hypothesis of a lower oil price of 100 2003-Crowns per barrel. 
The pension commission concluded then that there is, anyways, a need for a pension reform, 
even with a relatively wide span of assumptions about oil price, life expectancy and labor 
(Finansdepartement D. K., 2004-2005, s. 9). However those projections show a weakness lying 
in the fact that the actual price of oil is, for almost a decade now, far beyond the intervals chosen 
by the pension commission. The following figure shows how the oil price per barrel has 
substantially changed since 2003 and lies constantly over 180 2003-Crowns. 
 
Figure 15. New York Mercantile Exchange prices for West Texas Intermediate since 2000, monthly overlaid 
on daily prices to show the variation. 
 
This observation is enhanced by an analysis provided by the Head of Econ28’s Petroleum group, 
Knut Nørve on a Norwegian economic newspaper (Dagens Næringsliv). Nørve first observation 
is that the oil price has been over 50 2005-USD per barrel since 2003, which is twice the price 
of 180 2003-Crowns of the main hypothesis by the pension commission. Though such a price 
seemed unbelievable for the pension commission, the oil price has been over the average of 50 
2005-USD since 2005. Thus according to Nørve, the average of 50 2005-USD would be a better 
range than the 180-2003-Crowns main scenario by the pension commission. For him, this 
average of 50 2005-USD is set either to maintain itself or to rise, considering the growing 
                                                 
28 Econ is the Norwegian largest private consultative-, research-, advisory- firm 
and a renowned trendsetter in socio economic debate. (Grande, 2005, s. 5). 
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demand from China and India, the small number of discoveries outside Opec-countries, 
insecurity in Opec-area and expected rising production costs. The consequences of Econ’s 
scenario in terms of public finances are necessary more optimistic than those by the pension 
commission: Econ’s estimates lead to between 100 and 170 billion 2005-Crowns more  cash 
flow from oil exploitation to the government budget for the period 2006-2030 than the estimates 
by the Finance department; the GPFG will reach 5200 billion 2005-Crowns in 2020 that is twice 
the expected 2020 GNP; the oil revenues are projected to be 1000 billion 2005-Crowns larger 
than pension liabilities, even if the use of the oil-rent follows the prescription by the Fiscal Rule 
(Handlingsregelen in Norwegian). This alternative findings from Eco, undermines the 
arguments put forward by the pension commission to promote pension reform. (Løvås, 2005, 
ss. 4-5). 
Yet the pension commission’s main hypothesis of 140 2003-Crowns per barrel has not been 
upgraded till now, even in the parliament reform undertaken until 2011. As a result the pension 
reform in place corresponds to a fiscal consolidation policy against expected deficit of public 
finances based on unrealistic parameter value (i.e. the oil price).  
After having confronted the estimates of oil price by the pension commission with the 
suggestion by the Head of Econ’s Petroleums Group, the following sketch, summarizes the 
findings from the two subsequent subsections devoted on the on hand to the discount rate and 
on the other hand to the oil price29. 
 
                                                 
29 From economic theory, the Hotelling’s Rule is a way for finding an “alternativet” estimate of the oil price. Indeed the 
Hotelling’s Rule “states that the price of an exhaustible resource must grow at a rate equal to the rate of interest, both along an 
efficient extraction path and in a competitive resource industry equilibrium”. That is: 0
rt
tp p e  ; with tp the price in 
period t ; 0p the price in the initial period and r the interest rate. Relying on the Hotelling’s Rule would just leave one 
remaining problem that is the choice of the “best” interest rate (i.e. the inverse of the discount rate). Following this Hotelling’s 
Rule and for instance considering the 4% of the Fiscal Rule as the inverse of the Discount rate would yield higher oil price than 





Figure 16 The relationship between the discount rate and the oil price regarding the risk for the pension 
scheme. 
 
The pension commission applied a low discount rate to pension liabilities and considered a low 
oil price. This corresponds to the position on the bottom left of the sketched graph where it is 
the present generation of citizens that is to bear the risk burden of pension liability.  This burden 
would have been put on the future generation of citizens, if a higher discount rate and a higher 
oil price were considered by the pension commission.   
The debate about the pension reform lasted until 2009 and typically did not take into account 
the radically changed oil price, which would mean that the oil fund in 2010 already had 300 bn. 
Crowns, 1500 more than estimated in 2004. No mention of this fortunate circumstance was 
made in relation to this pension reform before it was put in place in 20011. This certainly prove 
a certain unwillingness to see extra incomes as good news because it would indicate less need 
for the pension reform. 
The subsection that comes last is an additional illustration of another debatable parameter value 
used by the pension commission in their projective estimations of pension future liabilities.  
 
 
 The estimation of labour per pensioner. 
The oil price and discount rate are not the only parameters that throw some doubt on the 
computation used to justify the necessity of reforming the Norwegian pension scheme. The 
metric of labour (assessed as the number of workers per pensioner by the pension commission) 
is also debatable. If one would use instead the number of hours per pensioner, then one would 
see a much larger drop from 1967 up to 2004 because of the increase in vacation and decrease 
in working hours. Thus the use of the number of hours per pensioner would have shown that 
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the demographic challenges highlighted by the pension commission has been significantly 
smaller than presented, which would have made the projected challenges seem less 
overwhelmed. 
This section has described how the fiscal consolidation measures, undertaken in the Norwegian 
pension scheme, seem to reflect the Norwegian politicians’ avoidance to inject the oil-rent into 
the economy. Through the illustrative cases of oil price, discount rate of unfunded liabilities, 
and number of workers per pensioner, one realizes that the figures used to defend fiscal 
consolidations measures adopted, could have been otherwise (considering the path of reference 
parameters), which would have invalided the projected pension challenges. Indeed, the figures 
used by the pension commission are not pure outcomes of mathematical modelling but reveal 
politicians preferences as they can directly be changed under political decisions. Furthermore 
despite the retained figures, even when the economic conjuncture has led the parameters to their 
most favourable values over a long period, no revision has been made by the pension 
commission. For example when the pure assumption turned out to be seriously off and the 
financial gaps of pension were essentially covered by 2010, the government did not reasonably 
revise its proposal. An additional puzzling behaviour is that of Norwegian central bank: why 
has the Norwegian central bank (i.e. Norges Bank) not paid attention to the inconsistencies 
about any of these parameters used as arguments by the pension commission to let know that 
Norway, with its financial wealth would have problems paying its pensions. This indicates that 
the Norwegian Central Bank clearly knew that the pension commission report was for domestic 
consumption only as it sells pit for the pension reform. At last, if Norway has pension problems 
then it makes little sense to invest in the debt of countries that has much larger potential 
(pensions) problems. Thus this pension reform goes with the idea of isolating the oil-rent from 
the Norwegian economy, what is totally understandable from an economic point of view (see 
the third chapter that highlights the isolation of the revenues from a booming sector a preventive 
means against the Dutch disease). Nevertheless, resorting to unrealistic values of parameters to 
justify a public policy violates the principle of transparency that guarantee the working of 





V.2.3. The allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent and the health scheme 
funding. 
This section is another illustration of the Norwegian government rationing the use of the oil-
rent for the welfare of present generation of citizens, this time, in the health area. It describes 
the allocation of Norwegian oil-rent to the health area, through link between health budget and 
the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). In Norway, the Ministry of Health (MOH) has 
overall responsibility of good and equitable health care for the population, regardless of 
residency and economy. The Health Directorate administers the Financial Activity-based 
funding (Innsatsstyrt finansiering – ISF, in Norwegian) and Quality-based funding 
(Kvalitetsbasert finansiering – KBF in Norwegian). In 2013, a health reform (called 
Norheimutvalget in Norwegian) was passed with the aim of finding the ways in which health 
care can use the available resources equitably. This health reform brought the concept and 
method of prioritizing in health care, which implies that given the resources the community 
should spend on health, some patient groups should get most, some have to stand the longest in 
the queue and some should pay more themselves (Hornburg, 2014, s. 8).This rule of priority is 
based on three criteria, namely: Condition of severity over time (Tilstandens alvorlighet in 
Norwegian), Benefits of treatment over time (Nytten av tiltaket in Norwegian), and 
Requirement of cost effectiveness (Kravet om kostnadseffektivitet in Norwegian). Thus, the 
three criteria determine the condition of treatment provision or exclusion to patients 
(Dommerud & Hornburg, 2014, s. 9). As a result, this health reform has led to a number of 
controversial issues about screening, vaccination, expensive cancer drugs, ceiling for uncertain 
and expensive treatment, etc… (Dommerud & Hornburg, 2014, s. 9). The following presents 
some instances of treatment rationing. 
 The rationing of some cancer treatment 
The most controversial issue so far is the refusal to make use of the medicine Perjeta against 
breast cancer, due to the high cost relative to output (Dommerud & Hornburg, 2014, s. 9). 
Unlike Denmark, Sweden, and Spain, where the health care pays for Perjeta treatment, the later 
has not been included among treatment supply due to its cost that would be too expensive 
relative to its outcome. In fact, the provision of Perjeta to about 100 patients would cost 120 
million Crowns yearly (Hansen E. E., 2014, s. 30). Compared to Denmark, Sweden and Spain, 
the economic stance of Norway is far more prosperous, which makes it hard to understand why 
Norway cannot afford this particular treatment.  
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Similarly, there was a controversy for the public funding of Ipilimumab (the drug against 
melanoma cancer) and Abirateron (the drug against prostate cancer) because of their 
expensiveness (Hornburg, 2014, s. 8). 
 The rationing of Hepatitis treatment. 
Hepatitis C, the infectious liver disease, was previously difficult to treat effectively. But in 2014 
a new, far more effective medication with fewer side effects entered the market. Thus doctors 
started its prescription, by all accounts with good results. In the winter of 2014 the prescription 
of this effective treatment against Hepatitis C stopped. Indeed, the National health authorities 
had decided that only patients who have come so far in the disease and that actually have 
developed liver damage should get the “legendary” medication. The patients, however, who 
have not developed sufficient damage, will not be cured. According to the Health Directorate, 
the goal of hepatitis C treatment in Norway is to prevent the development of cirrhosis, therefore 
only patients with advanced damaged are prioritized, considering the expensiveness of the new 
effective medication. This treatment cost between 500,000 and 1 million Crowns (Johansen, 
2015). 
Considering the amount of the Norwegian wealth in the GPFG and the state of the government 
budget compared to other OECD countries, it is hard to accept the reason of some treatment 
rationing by the scarcity of (financial) resources to pay the needed treatments 
The health reform commission  (Prioriteringsutvalg or Norheim Utvalg in Norwegian) with its 
criteria attempts to put a systematic view on these rationing activities  but these criteria are 
more theoretical than real since the first and second criteria clearly discriminate the other part 
of population. And the evaluation of life expectancy would for instance result in people from 
Oslo West being treated more frequently than people from Oslo East; or Women being treated 
more frequently than men since women live longer than men. This only shows that the 
Norwegian health reform commission with its criteria is more storytelling and politics 




V.2.4. Answering the question whether the Fiscal Rule is a tragic 
choice. 
Every allocation method for resources contains costs entailed by the relative scarcity of these 
resources. In the case of the Fiscal Rule that is the allocation method of the Norwegian oil-rent, 
the costs are for instance the cut of pension or health care rationing just addressed in the 
preceding sections. Though these costs may cause the degradation of welfare or death for 
citizens, they do not imply the qualification of the Fiscal Rule as a tragic method of allocation. 
Referring to Calabresi & Bobbitt  (1978), the Fiscal Rule would become a tragic choice for 
Nowegian citizens as soon as they find out that the politicians have not been completely honest 
(or transparent) regarding the criteria that form the basis of the Fiscal Rule. The point of this 
chapter is to highlight, among others, the Norwegian politicians’ ploy used in order to enact 
fiscal consolidation measures. Citizens’ awareness of this ploy is what will make them look at 
the Fiscal Rule as a tragic choice of Norwegian oil-rent allocation. Ideally, in accordance to the 
Democracy principles, the Government “claims have to win credibility” just as should the 
claims of any citizen. Unfortunately as shown in the preceding subsections, the politicians have 
not been completely transparent when considering the debatable figures they used to ration the 
allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent to the present generation of citizens. Before the Norwegian 
politicians’ stealth were exposed for instance by Flåten (2013) and Osmundsen (2015), the 
Fiscal Rule may seem a “necessary, unavoidable, rather than chosen” resource allocation 
method and its associated costs considered “merely a fatal misfortune”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 
1978, s. 21). However since the release of these articles by Flåten (2013) and Osmundsen (2015) 
and more surprisingly the absence of the government reaction, the Fiscal Rule can be taken as 




Chapter VI. WHAT THE ALLOCATION OF THE OIL-RENT 
REVEALS ON THE NORWEGIAN DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTION.  
 
The previous chapter provided some illustrations of how the Norwegian politicians have 
resorted to questionable economic assumptions and measurements in order to make it seem 
necessary to allocate less oil-rent to the welfare of the present generation of citizens. The 
arbitrary values chosen for instance for the oil price, pension liabilities discount rate, the 
contribution of the oil sector to the national income, or the remaining endowment in oil reserves 
reveal a certain biased transparency from politicians. Despite these findings, the rationing of 
present citizens welfare provision has not been revised, which suggests that the politicians 
questioned claims are still considered credible by the population that has not protested. The 
following is therefore devoted to understand the factors that would determine the credibility of 
claims in Norway.  In addition this part goes further by analysing the institutional consequences 
of the Norwegian procedure of credibility gaining: specifically, the more democratic this 
procedure the more democratic the Norwegian institution, vice-versa. 
VI.1. ON WHICH GROUND DOES THE CREDIBILITY OF ANY CLAIM RELIES 
IN NORWAY? 
“Credibility is the outcome of contingent social and cultural practice”. According to Vieira 
(2010, s. 25), in the practice to gain credibility, a claim is judged on three grounds: on the 
scientific or technical grounds, on political grounds, and on the grounds of the personal life of 
the claimant. This part compares the approach the politicians’ economist experts i.e. the 
economists from the ‘triangular guild’ -The Finance department, the Statistics agency, and the 
Central bank- (Hansson, 2015) with that of Flåten (2013) and Osmundsen (2015). 
VI.1.1. Credibility on the scientific grounds. 
The ground to consider here is that of the domain of economics, as the official documents from 
the Norwegian ‘triangular guild’ (Hansson, 2015) as well as the articles by Flåten (2013) and 
Osmundsen (2015) belong to the economic literature. It follows from this that either can gain 
credibility only by complying with the culture of economics, which establishes the 
“truthfulness” of claims based on proofs and in absence of obvious criticism (Vieira, 2010). 
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The procedure loosely goes as follows: A first article releases the findings of any proven 
inquiry. The claims from that first article automatically acquire credibility as long as it gets no 
criticism that is as long as no doubt is cast on the validity of these claims. However, it loses that 
credibility as soon as a second article (i.e. a critical article) that highlights its weakness (by 
denouncing its validity) is released. Then the first article has to be defended (by clarifying its 
validity) in order to gain its credibility back and consequently to make the second article (i.e., 
the critical article) lose its credibility, and so on so forth. In economics, credibility gains from 
an indirect communication that works via the release of articles that are valid. This ideal 
procedure is mostly facilitated by the fact that economics uses mathematics, which is a 
discipline where proving goes without saying. However, mathematics hides the assumptions 
that greatly condition mathematical data (e.g. figures, graphs…) generally used as proof in 
many economic claims. The documents produced by the ‘triangular guild’ (Hansson, 2015) to 
justify the social services rationing rely on some mathematical data such as the contribution of 
the oil sector to the Norwegian national income, the remaining amount of oil reserves in 
Norway, the expected oil price, the discount rate of pension liabilities, so on so forth… These 
mathematical data are dubious in the sense that  “the word data means things that are “given”: 
baseline truths, not things that are manufactured, invented, tailored or spun”; (Deaton, 2015). 
Flåten (2013) and Osmundsen (2015) show however in their articles that what the politicians 
did in their official documents is actually what is called “Mathiness” that is the “use of algebraic 
symbols and quantitative data to give an appearance of scientific content to ideological 
preconceptions”; (Kay, 2015). Flåten and  Osmundsen articles seem to provide “the plausibility 
of the claim; the known reliability of the procedures used to produce the […] claim; the 
directness and multiplicity of testimony; the accessibility and replicability of the phenomenon; 
the ability to impute bias to the claimants or to assess risks being taken in making the claims” 
(Vieira, 2010). All these aspects are expedient for the “technical judgement” hence the validity 
of Flåten and Osmundsen articles. As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, the absence 
of significant reaction from the government, after the criticism brought out by Flåten (2013) 
and Osmundsen (2015) can have different interpretation: on the one hand that even the 
Norwegian politicians recognize the validity (and hence the credibility) of Flåten (2013) and 
Osmundsen (2015) and in that case there would have been an upward adjustment of welfare 
provisions to the present generation of citizens;  on the other hand that the Norwegian politicians  
refuse to respect the rules of credibility gaining in the domain of economics and consider that 
their claims do not need to be valid in order to gain credibility. Alternatively it would be a 




VI.1.2. Credibility on the personal grounds. 
In reality the personal background constitutes factors such as “the personal reputation of the 
claimants or the reputation of the platform from which they speak, knowledge of the friends 
and allies of the claimants, including their personal reputation and power” that would play an 
appreciable role in the credibility of a claim. In connection to this, the question is whether Flåten 
(2013) and Osmundsen (2015) articles have seemingly so far failed to gain credibility, or 
reciprocally the documents from the ‘triangular guild’ has seemingly so far gained credibility 
due to these personal aspects. Is there a hierarchy among Norwegian economists that allows for 
communication only between the economists of the ‘triangular guild’ (the Finance department, 
the Norwegian agency of statistics, and the Norwegian Central Bank) but not with the other 
economists outside that ‘triangular guild’ (Hansson, 2015)? More precisely do official 
documents from the ‘triangular guild’ have the privilege of escaping the game for gaining 
credibility, as prescribed in the world of economics? All these questions lead to the question 
whether there is a polarization of Norwegian economists made of ‘plain’ economists on the one 
hand and on the other hand of economists from the ‘triangular guild’, well supported in the 
media. In that case, “the authority to speak resides solely with […] highly bounded, 
communities” such as the economists from the ‘triangular guild’ (Vieira, 2010, s. 26).  
 
VI.1.3. Credibility on the political grounds. 
Last but not least, the political ground deals with the “significance and scope of the claim,” that 
is, for instance the implications of the documents from ‘triangular guild’ (as opposed to Flåten 
and Osmundsen articles) for the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent. As seen before, the 
allocation method chosen for the Norwegian oil-rent is the Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregel in 
Norwegian). The documents from the ‘triangular guild’ content claims that determine the way 
the Norwegian oil-rent is allocated and therefore have a certain political echo. Flåten and 
Osmundsen articles that criticize the validity of those claims, undermine politicians’ credibility. 
This also has a political echo. Thus, there is an intricate “relationship between political interests 
and technical judgements” that may affect the process of credibility gaining. Gaining credibility 
on scientific grounds enhances the political credibility of an article that is already politically 
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interesting due to its topic. Producing an article or issuing official documents is at the same 
time taking “a credibility risk” and bidding “for rich credibility rewards” on scientific grounds. 
The more actively a claimant plays the game of credibility gaining, the higher his expected 
credibility risk and reward. Furthermore, the social, economic and/or political status of a 
claimant has an impact on his “own exposure to credibility-risk”. Thus, for debate like the resort 
to questionable data to reduce the allocation of the oil-rent to the present generation of citizens 
via  the rationing of some welfare services, Flåten’s and Osmundsen’s credibility risk is 
obviously minimum unlike the credibility risk of the politicians’ advised by the economists 
from the ‘triangular guild’. The risk in question here encompasses the (political) reputation of 
the claimant, which is more critical for the politicians. In that case, silence can be a cautious 
strategy. This is all the more reasonable given that the credibility Osmundsen and Flåten would 
expect to gain is more the “credibility internal to scientific practices” while the target of the 
Norwegian politicians is the “public credibility”. What are the chances for the claims in Flåten 
and Osmundsen articles to get out of the economists’ circle and reach the population compared 
to the claims in the documents by the ‘triangular guild’? The chances are minimal, which 
illustrates the monopole of public credibility held by the politicians’ experts from the 
Norwegian ‘triangular guild’. 
The Norwegian politicians’ absence of significant reaction after the release of Flåten (2013) 
and Osmundsen (2015) articles arouses the following question: what does the politicians’ 
violation of the “truthing” procedure, prescribed in economics for the game of credibility 
gaining (Vieira, 2010), implies or reveals about the Norwegian political institution? The 
subsequent paragraphs explore this question. 
 
VI.2. THE ‘TRIANGULAR GUILD’ CREATES A GROUND TO 
HYPERDEMOCRACY IN NORWAY? 
The data used by Norwegian politicians in order to enact fiscal consolidation measures, 
denounced by Flåten (2013) and Osmundsen (2015), and the afterwards behaviour of politicians 
reveals a sort of supra-credibility of politicians’ experts. This is a weakness for the Norwegian 
democratic apparatus.  “In practice democracy needs both formal rules and informal values that 
are not themselves subject to democratic control, exactly as the market needs external regulation 
of its parameters as well as what Adam Smith called moral sentiments. In particular these 
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external constraints are needed to restrain powerful interests that have risen within the system 
and which then use it to make it serve their own interest”; (Crouch, 2016, s. 146). The analysis 
of the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent shows thus, among others, some features of “hyper-
democracy” (Crouch, 2016, s. 147) since the Norwegian politicians seem “to do good by 
stealth” (Crouch, 2016, s. 149) via the use of questioned data for the implementation of fiscal 
consolidation measures and refuse any validity tests through exchanges with others economists. 
Indeed most of the inconsistent information released by the Finance Ministry (and never 
denounced by the Norwegian Central Bank) relies on data provided by the Norwegian agency 
of statistics. The question that this inevitably brings up is whether this is a deliberate choice 
done with “open-eyes” or whether these ‘mistakes’ are somehow induced by other parts of the 
institutional sphere? If these two institutions make recurrent ‘mistakes’, then why has the 
Norwegian Central Bank never warned them?  The answer is that the three institutions form a 
sort of ‘guild’. All the politicians and the experts working inside that ‘triangular guild’ trust 
each other (Skredderberget, 2015). This may explain the lack of attention pa id to Flåten (2013) 
and Osmundsen (2015) remarks. By doing so, the Norwegian politicians have chosen to 
sacrifice some transparency by arguing the primacy of the economic sphere. The concrete way 
they do it is by the application of what Sidgwick called the Government House Ethics, when 
they argue for the primacy of the economic sphere openly and stick to the primacy of the 
political sphere behind closed doors. The following figures gives an insight into the type of 




Figure 17 The dominant system determining the budget allocation 
60% debt and 3% deficit are chosen in figure 19, since they represent the Maastricht criteria of 
the monetary system not because they are in any way absolutely correct. In addition, they seem 
reasonable at the very least for visualization. Norway in this graphic has as previously stated in 
the introduction, an unprecedented economic freedom to determine its budgetary policy, 
contrary to most OECD countries where the economic system is predominant. Thus, Norway 
has at least a higher expected future finance income than its oil income in the year 2005. 
Thus the voters trust the politicians who trust each other but do not trust the voters in return, 
hence the politicians’ claims that Norway would belong to the area of economic primacy while 
it is not true. This is the observation, the analysis of the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent has 





The starting point of this work is the observation of a paradoxical behavior of Norwegian 
politicians in the allocation of the gigantic oil-rent. As a matter of fact, the fiscal consolidation 
measures they have been undertaking (via the rationing of some welfare services) that is their 
decision to allocate less oil-rent to the welfare of the present generation of citizens, appear 
puzzling given the gigantic size of the Norwegian oil-rent that insures the sustainability of 
public budget. The first reason found that explains the choice of social services rationing is that 
the transfer of oil revenues in a sovereign fund (i.e. the GPFG) has not permanently removed 
the threat of the Dutch disease. This inquiry shows how the idea of blocking the massive inflows 
of oil revenues into the Norwegian economy via the establishment of the GPFG has certainly 
driven the Dutch disease away, yet it has not completely got rid of it. The threat of the Dutch 
disease still hangs over Norway. We have to remember that the Dutch problem occurred when 
the government was spending its extra revenue. Norway has so far spent relatively a little of its 
revenue. The GPFG has just moved the problem in time, that is to say, as long as just a relative 
small amount is withdrawn to fund the Norwegian welfare, the Dutch disease is kept remote. 
However, if huge net amount will be needed in the future (for instance when the oil reserves 
exhaust), Norway will very likely show some symptoms of the Dutch disease. Thus Norway 
suffers from an unusual type of scarcity. This scarcity is not the limited size of the resource that 
constitute the oil fund relative to the size of Norwegian population but rather the limited size of 
the Norwegian population relative to the size of the oil fund: Norway has a problem of 
absorptive capacity. This is the main reason behind the rationing of some welfare services, 
which is covered by an alleged lack of resources, or concern for intergenerational equity. So 
the Fiscal Rule guideline may not have eliminated the danger of the Dutch disease, but merely 
moved it into a distant future. We therefore cannot afford to make some thoughts about such a 
future, otherwise it would be ‘kicking the can down the road’. When that future comes, Norway 
may be forced for instance to consider joining the European monetary union to keep the 
currency down, which will be the ultimate irony, for Norwegian citizens who have so far be 
reluctant to join the European Union.  
The main reason found in the course of this inquiry and that explains the rationing of welfare 
services in Norway in this work is the fear to incur the Dutch disease. But this work stays 
opened to additional conjectures and research fields regarding the motives behind the allocative 
choice of the Norwegian oil-rent: for instance, the Norwegian government may feel Norway 
has a crisis as it is (as shows the first figure in the introduction) the only country that is not in 
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crisis. Norway is then a sort of ‘aberrant point’ among the OECD countries: this causes for 
instance a loss in (labor price- wage) competitiveness. So reasoning, imply that a country, that 
performs economically well while its trade partners register gloom, may be adversely affected 
by its favorable position since it cannot undertake any competitive cut. Thus the Norwegian 
politicians may pretend challenges in order to stay in the same line as Norway economic 
partners.  
The second additional reason that may explain the Norwegian politicians’ restraint to allocate 
further oil-rent for the welfare of the present generation of citizens is the puritanism culture 
(referred to as “den norske folkesjelens” in Norwegian); (Skredderberget, 2015, s. 203). This 
cultural aspect though it would be neglected by a mainstream economic analysis justifies well 
the saving-oriented behaviour of Norwegian politicians. 
A third addition reason that can also explain the Norwegian politicians’ avoidance to allocate 
further oil-rent to present generation of citizens is their unwillingness to offset the economic 
equilibrium. Indeed, blocking the oil proceeds in a sovereign fund has maintained Norway in a 
certain steady state. Allowing the inflow of a huge net amount of the oil-rent into the Norwegian 
economy will take Norway in a new steady state. Taking responsibility of such structural 
changes may be a ‘heavy task’ for Norwegian politicians. Thus, economic freedom implies 
responsibility. And substantial unprecedented economic freedom as the one of Norway entails 
greater responsibility that is avoid such a ‘political hot potato’ by Norwegian politicians. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have listed some possible reasons that may explain politicians’ 
choice to allocate less oil-rent to the present generation of Norwegian citizens. This work has 
just focused on the problem of absorptive capacity of the oil-rent, that constrain the Norwegian 
politicians to resort to “storytelling” by manufacturing unrealistic figures regarding for instance 
the contribution of the oil sector to value creation in Norway, the discount rate of pension 
liabilities, the expected oil price, the remaining endowment in oil reserves, etc… in order to 
justify their avoidance to use the oil-rent. This case of Norwegian politicians’ dishonesty by 
pretending the relative scarcity of resource for providing sufficient welfare services, is not a 
new phenomenon and political hypocrisy is not a specific Norwegian phenomenon. Indeed 
“there is a lot of hypocrisy at work in contemporary politics” (Runciman, 2008, s. 1). Politicians 
evolve in a world of “double standards” (Skredderberget, 2015, s. 124) where the trend is to 
deliberately say in public what is not really held in privacy. Though one’s reflex towards 
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“political hypocrisy” is blame, Runciman recommends a tolerant look at it in order to catch its 
complexities and motives (Runciman, 2008, ss. 1-3). To analyze the inconsistency noticed in 
the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent, I abide to Runciman’s advice in order to avoid self-
deception of politicians’ sincerity and try to proceed to a neutral inquiry. A finding is that 
Runciman’s “political hypocrisy” is what Sidgwick called Government House Ethics – GHE or 
Government House Utilitarianism – GHU. What is held privately is also referred to as “esoteric 
morality” which can only be understood by experts or exceptional individuals; (Skidelsky, 
1994, ss. 36-37)30. This inquiry has enabled to find out that what is held privately is a less 
alarming  future economic situation than the one forecast by the Norwegian politicians and the 
economists working either in the Finance Ministry, the Norwegian Central Bank, or the 
Norwegian Statistics Agency. One can go further and state that what is held privately (and 
hidden by the “mathiness” of the Norwegian ‘experts’) is a more prosperous economic future 
when Norway is fiscally compared to other democratic countries; (Kay, 2015). 
 
However this strategy of GHU, though it is economically understandable, turns out to adversely 
affect the Norwegian political institutions as GHU illustrates the Norwegian politicians’ biased 
transparency, subtle opacity, or dishonesty towards citizens. The good quality of Norwegian 
institutions plays a key role in the Norwegian model. The secret of the Norwegian model is 
trust to institutions that makes the society works at its best: Norwegian citizens have confidence 
in politicians, in the power apparatus, in the system itself and politicians have confidence in 
each other. Honesty is defined as one of the criteria for the allocation method of the Norwegian 
oil-rent (i.e., the Fiscal Rule). Dishonesty makes the opportunity costs (such as pension cuts or 
health care rationings -seen in chapter V) brought about by the pretended relative scarcity of 
the resource that constitute the oil-rent, painful. For this reason, the Fiscal Rule can be 
considered a tragic choice (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, ss. 1-28), as the Norwegian politicians 
are ready to flout honesty, a key element of the political system (by the Government House 
Ethics) so as to defend better the economic system against a potential Dutch disease and the 
loss of national competitiveness hedge. But this work illustrates via the allocation method of 
the Norwegian oil-rent, the complexity in the trust-based relationship of the Norwegian model. 
                                                 




Specifically, this paper shows how the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent puts the Norwegian 
politicians through a trade-off between equality, efficiency, and honesty that may be called the 
‘iron triangle’. Politicians’ fear for economic inefficiency (equivalently their preferences for 
economic efficiency) results in an erosion of trust that is the glue of well-working institutions. 
The problem of transparency noticed regarding the allocation of the Norwegian oil-rent reveals 
an asymmetric trust: the citizens trust politicians (i.e. their representatives) but the politicians 
do not trust the citizens, hence their dishonesty. I consider the Norwegian institutions as one of 
the inputs that are used to produce the impressive wealth accumulated since the start of oil 
exploitation. This work shows that an “institutional capital” should be explicitly recognized and 
added to human capital, man-made capital, and natural capital when analyzing the Norwegian 
economic model. The point of this work is, among others, that the Norwegian politicians’ 
(GHU) strategy of avoiding the Dutch disease damages this “institutional capital”, which with 
time may weaken the performance of the Norwegian model. 
 
This study of the Norwegian oil-rent allocation shows in summary how the measures taken to 
prevent a potential economic problem (e.g., the Dutch disease) has led to the political problem 
of transparency or honesty. Transparency is an important principle in democracy as it enables 
citizens to take rational decision. For this reason, any form of opacity or biased transparency is 
criticized. However, from a utilitarian view it is the outcome of any action that matter. A reason 
for this is that “liberal democratic politics are only sustainable if mixed with a certain amount 
of dissimulation and pretence”. (Runciman, s. 3).Thus by making the implemented fiscal 
consolidations measures seem “necessary and unavoidable, rather than chosen” the Norwegian 
politicians try “to convert what is tragically chosen into what is merely” presented as lack of 
sufficient resource (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 21). “Whether the decision is perceived as 
tragic […] is a function of what methods are used to cope with the […] scarcity; (Calabresi & 
Bobbitt, 1978, s. 23).  Furthermore “Evasions, disguise, temporizing, and deception are all ways 
by which artfully chosen allocation methods can avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile 
values in conflict” (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 26). The Norwegian government has tied itself 
to the mast of the Fiscal Rule (Handlingsregelen in Norwegian) and has been using less of the 
oil-rent as the fund grows so as not to be seduced by the seductive song of the sirens (of all the 




Since we started out this work with an analysis of the Dutch disease, it would be tempting to 
conclude with pointing at a Norwegian disease. This cannot be done but this work points to a 
‘virus’ into a system that could very well bring on a disease namely the erosion of transparency 
that can in the long run undermine some qualities of Norwegian institutions and thereby the 
potential trust into the system. The politicians should trust the voters with valid information and 
take the chances with the political sphere which they all defend.   
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APPENDIX 1: Corden and Neary Dutch disease model. 
Preliminaries 
, , :  a three sector model where 
       denotes the energy (or  booming) sector,
       denotes the manufacture (or lagging) sector, and 
       denotes the services sector.






, :  The model considers two factors of production that are





 :  Price of output in sector , , , .jp j j E M S  
:  The level of real income.




ˆ ln :  The change in real income.y d y  
:  The quantity of factor  used per unit of output in sector .ija i j  
ˆ :  The demand for services.SC  
:  The compensated own-price elasticity of services demand.S  
:  The share of energy sector in national income.E  
:  The share of factor  in the value of output in sector .ij i j  
:  The Hicksian measure of the extent of technological improvement
      (measures the proportional increase in energy output, 
       holding constant the employment of all factors in that sector).

 
     ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
:  The proportion of factor  used in sector ,
                 describes the redistribution of labor supply among the three sectors.
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j
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:  The wage elasticity of the aggregate demand for labour.  
:  The proportional contribution of sector  to .j j   
:  determines the resource movement effect.E  
ˆ :  The change in the wage rate.
:  The rental return to capital of sector .







:  The Hicks-Allen partial elasticity of susbstitution between  and 





 ˆ ˆ ˆ












  :  The compensated elasticity of excess supply of services at a given wage rate.S S   
: The compensated elasticity of excess supply of services 




:  The real income elasticity of services demand,
      determines the magnitude of the spending effect.
:  The proportional contribution of sector  to ,





       ( :  is the wage elasticity of the aggregate demand for labour).
 
If both parameters 0   and 0E  , then the increase in Er  is proportional to   (the 
Hicksian measure of the extent of technological improvement), and no other domestic variables 
are affected by the boom. 
The model starts with the conditions of full-employment of labor factor,  
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LE E LM M LS Sa X a X a X L    
with the demand for labor factor on the left hand side (LHS) and the supply of labor factor on 
the right hand side (RHS): where ija  represents the quantity of factor i used per unit of output 
in sector j; EX , MX , SX  are respectively the outputs from the booming (i.e. energy), lagging 
(i.e. manufactures), and services sector; 
The Model with Labor as the Only Mobile Factor. 
Let’s keep in mind that   determines the magnitude of the spending effect and E of the 
resource movement effect. 
 On the market of production factors. 
The model starts with the conditions of full-employment of labor factor,  
LE E LM M LS Sa X a X a X L        (A1) 
with the demand for labor factor on the left hand side (LHS) and the supply of labor factor on 
the right hand side (RHS): where ija  represents the quantity of factor i used per unit of output 
in sector j; EX , MX , SX  are respectively the outputs from the booming (i.e. energy), lagging 
(i.e. manufactures), and services sector;  
Then follows the equation of full-employment of the specific factor (i.e. the capital) in each of 
the three sectors.  
   , ,   
KE E E
Kj j j KM M M
KS S S
a X K




   
 
  (A5) 
The Demand for capital is in the LHS while the supply is in the RHS. 
The conditions for full-employment implies that the weighted sum of sectorial labor demand is 
zero as the labor supply (or more generally the endowment of all factors) is assumed fixed: 
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   
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       
Totally differentiating:
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0 0 0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0     6
LE KE LM KM LS KS
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a a a a a a
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        
     
     
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0,   0,   0,   0 E M SK K K L     
Since the supply of production factors is fixed, i.e.: 
 
ˆconstant ln 0
ˆ ˆconstant lnK 0   
, ,
j j j
L L d L
K K d
j E M S
   




     ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0LE LE KE LM LM KM LS LS KSa a a a a a          (A6) 
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
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   

         

   
  (A7) 
The Hicks or direct elasticity of substitution is traditionally derived 
from the production function. 
Stern, David I. (2008): Derivation of the Hicks Elasticity of 




The conditions of profit maximization (price-equal-to-unit-cost):  
ˆ ˆ ˆ
E LE KE Ep w r       (A8) 
ˆ ˆ0 LM KM Mw r     (A9) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S LS KS Sp w r     (A10) 
ˆ ˆ
E S Sw p       (A11) 
Substituting (A7), (A8), (A9), (A10) into (A6) and rearranging gives 
(A11): 






































   
 
 Turning now to the market of services: 
The equation for the change in services demand: 
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S S SC p y        (A2) 
A recourse to Slutsky’s conditions to the variations of services demand  , , ,S S S M EC C p p p Y
, gives the expression in the left side. 
The Equation of the change in the real income is given by: 
ˆ
Ey     (A3) 
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The change in the real income: ˆ lny d y . 
The real income varies with the transfers   (i.e. the Hicksian measure of the extent of 
technological improvement) weighted by their part in the national income E . 
Then the variations of services demand comes as follows: 
ˆ ˆ
S S S EC p         (A4) 
Substituting the term of real income by its components, gives a more detailed expression of the 
change in the services demand. 
Then comes the expression of services supply:  










  ˆ ˆS S S S Ep w           (A14) 
(A14) comes from the equalization of (A4) and (A13) that is the 
services demand and supply. 
 S S  is the compensated elasticity of excess supply of services at a given wage rate. 
 The last step consists in jointly solving (A11) and (A14) in order to get the effects of 
the boom on Sp  and w : 
 ˆ 0S E S EAp           (A15) 
 ˆ 0S E S S EAw              (A16) 
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  0S S SA I          (A17) 
 is the compensated elasticity of excess supply of services, when Sp  induces a change in w . 
 Derived comparative-static effects: 
This part sets forth changes in the returns to factors of production. It is the comparison between 
these returns to production factors before and after the boom. The sign of the components in 
the RHS of the following equations indicates whether they move to the same or opposite 
direction to the returns to production factors. 
The comparative-static effect concerning the return to labor (i.e., the real wage) 
The real wage determines the change in the output and employment levels of the services sector.  
The first expression shows “the change in the real (product) wage in the services sector”.  
   ˆ ˆ S E S E SA w p I                (A18) 
 The second expression represents the “change in the real wage from the [`wage-earners’] 
standpoint”. 
      ˆ ˆS S E S S E S S SA w p I                  (A19) 
S  represents the “share of services in the consumption basket of wage-earners”. 
The comparative-static effect concerning the return to specific factors in each sector 
The following expressions result from combining equations (A15) and (A16) with (A8), (A9), 
and (A10).  
The change in the rental on specific factor in the energy sector: 
   ˆKE E S LE E S LE E S S LE EAr I I                     (A20) 
The change in the rental on specific factor in the manufacturing sector: 
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 ˆ 0KM M LM S E E S SAr                   (A21) 
The change in the rental on specific factor in the services sector: 
   ˆKS S LS S E E KS S LS SAr I                    (A22) 
The change in the rental in the energy sector relative to the price of services: 
     ˆ ˆKE E S E S LE KE S M S LE EA r p I                    (A23) 
The change in the rental differential between the manufacturing and energy sectors: 
   ˆ ˆ ˆKE KM E M KM LM LEr r w               (A24)
        ˆ ˆKE KM E M S E LM LE S KE E KM M S KE E KM EA r r I                           
(A25) 
This expression is obtained by substituting from (A16) for ŵ . 
 
Labor mobile between the three sectors and capital mobile between the lagging and services 
sector 
Let’s keep in mind that   determines the magnitude of the spending effect and LwE of the 
resource movement effect. 
 On the market of production factors: 
As the manufacturing and the services sectors share now one same specific factor, the rentals 
Mr and Sr  are replaced by the unique return to specific factor, MSr . 
 “The relationship between the wage rate and the price of services (both measured in 
terms of manufactures)”: 
ˆ ˆ
KM Sw p     (A26) 
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LM LS KS KM         (A27) is “the determinant of the matrix 
of factor shares in the manufacturing and services sectors”. 
It is “positive if and only manufacturing is more labor-intensive than services”. 
 
 ˆ ˆ ˆS KS Sw p p      (A28) 
“From the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the change in Sp determines the direction of change in 
the real wage.” 
 The change in labor supply, EL , in the energy sector is the function of wage rate and 
technology level “(since Ep  is held constant)”: 
KM M KS S MSa X a X K   (A29) 







    (A32) 
 ˆ ˆMS LwL E w     (A33) 













Is the labor supply elasticity. 
A 0LwE   implies no resource movement effect in the model. 
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 Turning now to the market of services: 
The approach by Jones (1965) and the model by Martin and Neary (1980) have been used in 
order to solve for the “general-equilibrium services sector supply function”: 
ˆ ˆ KM




   (A35) 
LM LS     (A36) is the determinant of the matrix factor 
allocations to the manufacturing and services sectors and is positive 
if and only if manufacturing is relatively labor-intensive. 
“By assumption, there are no factor-market distortions”; therefore 
 and  ” have the same sign”. 
KM KM
S S LwE E E
 
 
  (A37) is “the general-equilibrium price-elasticity of supply of services 
taking account of the variability of labor supply”; where SE  is the fixed labor supply elasticity. 
To get the effect of the boom on the price of services, the demand (A4) and supply (A35) of 
services have been equated: 
Recall that ˆ ˆS S S EC p      (A4) 
ˆ KM





   
 
  (A38) 
Where S SB E    (A39) is the “general-equilibrium elasticity of excess supply of services and 
is necessarily positive”. 
Thus the signs of the components in the RHS of this equation reveal the variables that have a 
positive and the ones that have a negative impact on the price of the services. Here, as we have 
both a positive and a negative sign, more information on the magnitude of these variables is 
needed in order to know whether the price of services will rise or fall. 
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Now the change in the manufacturing is gotten from the same processes as those that enabled 
to obtain (A35): 
ˆ ˆ KS




    (A40) 
Where “ ME  is defined analogously to SE  and is positive”. 
“Substituting from (A38) for ˆSp  (and making use of the fact that KM M KS SE E  ) yields the 
required result”: 
ˆ KS





    
 
 (A41) 
This equation shows that the manufacturing output is a negative function of the set of variables 
in the RHS. Therefore it is obvious that the output in the manufacturing sector decreases 
anyway, considering that each of the variables is non-negative. 
Labor and capital mobile between the three sectors 
In this case, there is one common wage rate ( w ) and one common rental ( r ) on the capital for 
the three sectors. “The coefficient on   determines the sign of the spending effect whereas the 
coefficient on S  determines the sign of the resource movement effect”. 
The effect of boom on the wage rate: 
ˆ
E KMw  
      (A42) 
The equation is obtained by suppressing the common rental ( r ) from 
(A8) and (A9). 
E LE LM     (A43) is “the determinant of the matrix of factor shares in the energy and 




The wage rate is then a positive function of KM (the share of factor K  in the value of output 
in sector M ) and  (the Hicksian measure of the extent of technological improvement, which 
measures the proportional increase in energy output, holding constant the employment of all 
factors in that sector). 








        (A44) 
“The equations (42) and (A43) underlie the results presented in Table 2 in Chapter III”. 









   
 
  (A45) 
(A45) is “obtained by substituting (A44) into (A4)”. 
The equation “shows that the spending effect   necessarily raises the output of services, 
whereas the resource movement effect S  raises it provided manufacturing is not extremal in 
terms of relative factor intensities”. 
The effect of the boom on the manufacturing output: 
KE E KM M KS Sa X a X a X K     (A46) 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆLE E LM M LS S LX X X w r          (A47) 
“We use the full-employment constraints (A1) 
LE E LM M LS Sa X a X a X L    for labor  
and the corresponding equation for capital (A46) 




 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆKE E KM M KS S KX X X w r          (A48) 
(A47) and (A48) are obtained from “differentiating (A1) and (A46) 
and relating the changes in input-output coefficients to changes in 
wage-rental ratio in the manner of Jones (1965)”. 
L  and K , respectively, represents “the elasticity of demand for 
labor and capital at given output levels in response to a change in the 
wage-rental ratio; these parameters are positive and their magnitude 










       (A49) 
(A49) is obtained by “eliminating ˆ EX  from (A47) and (A48) and using (A8) and (A9) to 
eliminate the change in the wage-rental ratio”. 
The second term in (A49): 
KE L LE K       (A50) is the weighted sum of L and K  and is necessarily positive”. 
“ E  is defined in (A43) and E LE KM LM KE       (A51) is the determinant of the matrix of 
factor allocations to the energy and manufacturing sectors”. It “is positive if and only if energy 
is labor-intensive relative to manufacturing and so it has the same sign as E  . The second 
term in (A49) is thus unambiguously negative, reflecting the direct de-industrialization brought 
about by the resource movement effect of the boom. This corresponds in Fig. 5 to the movement 
of the manufacturing production point from A’ to F”. 
The first term in (A49): 
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Its “magnitude depends on the change in services output brought about by the boom. 
Substituting this change from (A45), the change in manufacturing output may alternatively be 
written as follows”:  
 ˆM E S E S S
E E
I
X        
 
     (A52) 
“The coefficients of   (which determines the sign of the spending effect) and of S (which 
determines the sign of that part of the resource movement effect working through the price of 
services) may be positive or negative depending on the relative factor intensities of all three 
sectors. These operate both through the determinants   and E  already defined and through 
the determinant S , which is defined in a similar manner to E ”: 
S LS KE LE KS        (A53) 
This is positive if and only if services are labor-intensive relative to energy. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: Models and Theorems used in Corden & 
Neary Model. 
 
I. Appendix 2.1.The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Theorem. 
“The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states that a country which is capital-abundant will export the 
capital-intensive good. Likewise, the country which is labor-abundant will export the labor-
intensive good. Each country exports that good which it produces relatively better than the other 
country. In this model a country's advantage in production arises solely from its relative factor 
abundance. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem - Graphical Depiction - Variable Proportions 
The H-O model assumes that the two countries (US and France) have identical technologies, 
meaning they have the same production functions available to produce steel and clothing. The 
model also assumes that the aggregate preferences are the same across countries. The only 
difference that exists between the two countries in the model is a difference in resource 
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endowments. We assume that the US has relatively more capital per worker in the aggregate 
than does France. This means that the US is capital-abundant compared to France. Similarly, 
France, by implication, has more workers per unit of capital in the aggregate and thus is labor-
abundant compared to the US. We also assume that steel production is capital-intensive and 
clothing production is labor-intensive. 
The difference in resource 
endowments is sufficient to 
generate different PPFs in the two 
countries such that equilibrium 
price ratios would differ in 
autarky. To see why, imagine first 
that the two countries are identical 
in every respect. This means they 
would have the same PPF 
(depicted as the brown PPF0 in the 
adjoining figure), the same set of 
aggregate indifference curves and the same autarky equilibrium. Given the assumption about 
aggregate preferences, that is U = CCCS, the indifference curve, I, will intersect the countrys' 
PPFs at point A, where the absolute value of the slope of the tangent line (not drawn), (PC/PS), 
is equal to the slope of the ray from the origin through point A. The slope is given by CSA/CCA. 
In other words, the autarky price ratio in each country will be given by, 
 
Next suppose that labor and capital are shifted between the two countries. Suppose labor is 
moved from the US to France while capital is moved from France to the US. This will have two 
effects. First, the US will now have more capital and less labor, France will have more labor 
and less capital than initially. This implies that K/L>K*/L*, or that the US is capital-abundant 
and France is labor-abundant. Secondly, the two countries PPFs will shift. To show how, we 
apply the Rybczynski theorem. 
The US experiences an increase in K and a decrease in L. Both changes will cause an increase 
in output of the good that uses capital intensively (i.e. steel) and a decrease in output of the 
other good (clothing). The Rybczynski theorem is derived assuming that output prices remain 
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constant. Thus if prices did remain constant, production would shift from point A to B in the 
diagram and the US PPF would shift from the brown PPF0 to the green PPF. 
Using the new PPF we can deduce what the US production point and price ratio would be in 
autarky given the increase in the capital stock and decline in labor stock. Consumption could 
not occur at point B since, 1) the slope of the PPF at B is the same as the slope at A since the 
Rybczynski theorem was used to identify it, and 2) homothetic preferences implies that the 
indifference curve passing through A must have a steeper slope since it lies along a steeper ray 
from the origin. 
Thus, to find the autarky production point we simply find the indifference curve which is 
tangent to the US PPF. This occurs at point C on the new US PPF along the original indifference 
curve, I. (Note: the PPF was conveniently shifted so that the same indifference curve could be 
used. Such an outcome is not necessary but does make the graph less cluttered.) The negative 
of the slope of the PPF at C is given by the ratio of quantitiesCS'/CC' . Since CS'/CC' > CSA/CCA, 
it follows that the new US price ratio will exceed the one prevailing before the capital and labor 
shift, i.e., PC/PS > (PC/PS)0. In other words, the autarky price of clothing is higher in the US 
after it experiences the inflow of capital and outflow of labor. 
France experiences an increase in L and a decrease in K. These changes will cause an increase 
in output of the labor-intensive good (i.e. clothing) and a decrease in output of the capital-
intensive good (steel). If price were to remain constant, production would shift from 
point A to D in the diagram and the French PPF would shift from the brown PPF0 to the 
red PPF*. 
Using the new PPF we can deduce the French production point and price ratio in autarky, given 
the increase in the capital stock and decline in labor stock. Consumption could not occur at 
point D since homothetic preferences implies that the indifference curve passing 
through D must have a flatter slope since it lies along a flatter ray from the origin. Thus to find 
the autarky production point we simply find the indifference curve which is tangent to the 
French PPF. This occurs at point E on the new French PPF along the original indifference 
curve,I. (As before, the PPF was conveniently shifted so that the same indifference curve could 
be used.) The negative of the slope of the PPF at C is given by the ratio of quantities CS"/CC", 
Since CS'/CC" < CSA/CCA, it follows that the new French price ratio will be less than the one 
prevailing before the capital and labor shift, i.e.,PC*/PS* < (PC/PS)0. This means that the autarky 




All of the above implies that as one country becomes labor-abundant and the other capital-
abundant, it causes a deviation in their autarky price ratios. The country with relatively more 
labor (France) is able to supply relatively more of the labor-intensive good (clothing) which in 
turn reduces the price of clothing in autarky relative to the price of steel. The US with relatively 
more capital can now produce more of the capital-intensive good (steel) which lowers its price 
in autarky relative to clothing. These two effects together imply that 
 
Any difference in autarky prices between the US and France is sufficient to induce profit-
seeking firms to trade. The higher price of clothing in the US (in terms of steel) will induce 
firms in France to export clothing to the US to take advantage of the higher price. The higher 
price of steel in France (in terms of clothing) will induce US steel firms to export steel to France. 
Thus, the US, abundant in capital relative to France, exports steel, the capital-intensive good. 
France, abundant in labor relative to the US, exports clothing, the labor-intensive good.This is 




II. Appendix 2.2.The Rybczynski Theorem. 
“The Relationship between Endowments and Outputs. 
The Rybczynski theorem demonstrates how changes in an endowment affects the outputs of the 
goods when full employment is maintained. The theorem is useful in analyzing the effects of 
capital investment, immigration and emigration within the context of a H-O model. Consider a 
diagram depicting a labor constraint in red (it's the steeper lower line) and a capital constraint 
in blue (the flatter line). Suppose production occurs initially on the PPF at point A. 
Next, suppose there is an increase in the labor endowment. 
This will cause an outward parallel shift in the labor 
constraint. The PPF and thus production will shift to point 
B. Production of clothing, the labor intensive good, will 
rise from C1 to C2. Production of steel, the capital-
intensive good, will fall from S1 to S2. 
If the endowment of capital rose the capital constraint 
would shift out causing an increase in steel production and 
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a decrease in clothing production. Recall that since the labor constraint is steeper than the capital 
constraint, steel is capital-intensive and clothing is labor-intensive. 
This means that in general, an increase in a country's endowment of a factor will cause an 
increase in output of the good which uses that factor intensively, and a decrease in the 
output of the other good. 
http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch60/T60-3.php 
 
III. Appendix 2.3.The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem demonstrates how changes in output prices affect the prices of 
the factors when positive production and zero economic profit are maintained in each industry 
. It is useful in analyzing the effects on factor income, either when countries move from autarky 
to free trade or when tariffs or other government regulations are imposed within the context of 
a H-O model. 
Due to the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, if production occurs in an industry, 
then economic profit is driven to zero. The zero profit conditions in each industry imply, 
 
 
where PS and PC are the prices of steel and clothing respectively, w is the wage paid to labor 
and r is the rental rate on capital. Note that  is the dollar 
payment to workers per ton of steel produced, while  is 
the dollar payment to capital owners per ton of steel produced. The right-hand-side sum then is 
the dollars paid to all factors per ton of steel produced. If the payments to factors for each ton 
produced equals the price per ton then profit must be zero in the industry. 
The same logic is used to justify the zero profit condition in the clothing industry. 
We imagine that firms treat prices exogenously since any one firm is too small to affect the 
price in its market. Since the factor output ratios are also fixed, wages and rentals remain as the 




The set of all wage and rental rates which will generate zero 
profit in the steel industry at the price PS is given by the 
flatter blue line. At wage and rental combinations above the 
line, as at points A and D, the per unit cost of production 
would exceed the price and profit would be negative. At 
wage-rental combinations below the line as at points B and 
C, the per unit cost of production would fall short of the 
price and profit would be positive. Notice that the slope of 
the flatter blue line is . 
Similarly the set of all wage-rental rate combinations which generate zero profit in the clothing 
industry at price PC is given by the steeper red line. All wage-rental combinations above the 
line, as at points B and D, generate negative profit, while wage-rental combinations below the 
line, as at A and C, generate positive profit. The slope of the steeper red line 
is . 
The only wage-rental combination that can simultaneously support zero profit in both industries 
is found at the intersection of the two zero-profit lines - point E. This point represents the 
equilibrium wage and rental rates that would arise in an H-O model when the price of steel is 
PS and the price of clothing is PC. 
Now, suppose there is an increase in the price of one of the 
goods. Say the price of steel, PS, rises. This could occur if 
a country moves from autarky to free trade, or, if a tariff is 
placed on imports of steel. The price increase will cause an 
outward parallel shift in the blue zero-profit line for steel 
as shown in the adjoining Figure. The equilibrium point 
will shift from E to F causing an increase in the equilibrium 
rental rate from r1 to r2, and a decrease in the equilibrium 
wage rate from w1 to w2. Only with a higher rental rate and lower wage can zero profit be 
maintained in both industries at the new set of prices. Using the slopes of the zero-profit lines 
we can show that  which means that clothing is labor intensive and steel is capital 
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intensive. Thus, when the price of steel rises, the payment to the factor used intensively in steel 
production (capital) rises, while the payment to the other factor (labor) falls. 
If the price of clothing had risen, the zero-profit line for clothing would have shifted right 
causing an increase in the equilibrium wage rate and a decrease in the rental rate. Thus an 
increase in the price of clothing causes an increase in the payment to the factor used intensively 
in clothing production (labor) and a decrease in the payment to the other factor (capital). 
This gives us the Stolper-Samuelson theorem: An increase in the price of a good will cause 
an increase in the price of the factor used intensively in that industry and a decrease in 
the price of the other factor. 
http://internationalecon.com/Trade/Tch60/T60-5.php. 
The Magnification Effect for Prices. 
The magnification effect for prices is a more general version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
It allows for simultaneous changes in both output prices and compares the magnitudes of the 




IV. Appendix 2.4.The Factor-Price Equalization. 
“The fourth major theorem that arises out of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is called the factor-
price equalization theorem. Simply stated the theorem says that when the prices of the output 
goods are equalized between countries as they move to free trade, then the prices of the 
factors (capital and labor) will also be equalized between countries. 
This implies that free trade will equalize the wages of workers and the rents earned on capital 
throughout the world. 
The theorem derives from the assumptions of the model, the most critical of which is the 
assumption that the two countries share the same production technology and that markets are 
perfectly competitive. 
In a perfectly competitive market the return to a factor of production depends upon the value of 
its marginal productivity. The marginal productivity of a factor, like labor, in turn depends upon 
the amount of labor being used as well as the amount of capital. As the amount of labor rises in 
an industry, labor's marginal productivity falls. As the amount of capital rises, labor's marginal 
productivity rises. Finally the value of productivity depends upon the output price commanded 
by the good in the market. 
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In autarky, the two countries face different prices for the output goods. The difference in prices 
alone is sufficient to cause a deviation in wages and rents between countries, because it affects 
the marginal productivity. However, in addition, in a variable proportions model the difference 
in wages and rents also affects the capital-labor ratios in each industry, which in turn affects the 
marginal products. All of this means that for various reasons the wage and rental rates will 
differ between countries in autarky. 
Once free trade is allowed in outputs, output prices will become equal in the two countries. 
Since the two countries share the same marginal productivity relationships it follows that only 
one set of wage and rental rates can satisfy these relationships for a given set of output prices. 
Thus free trade will equalize goods prices and wage and rental rates. 
Since the two countries face the same wage and rental rates they will also produce each good 
using the same capital-labor ratio. However, because the countries continue to have different 




APPENDIX 3:  The measurement of profitability. 
 “There exists much controversy regarding the most appropriate measure of 
profitability. Among different measures of profit, two most widely accepted 
measures are the price-cost margins and rate of return on assets or equity”. Yet, “a 
major problem with rate of return measure of profitability arises from lack of 
comparable data on assets classified by suitably disaggregated industry (Clarke 
1985)”. That is why “in most studies”, profitability “is measured as value added at 
factor cost minus wages and salaries, depreciation and other over-head costs divided 
by total revenue, and hence is an approximation to the ratio of gross profits and 
overheads to sales. The use of price-cost margin, as a measure of profit rates, has 
been criticized on the ground that it is profit rate on the firm's sales, not on firm's 
invested capital or asset (Benishay, 1967). However, on the same ground price-cost 
margin has been regarded as a superior measure of profit. The price-cost margins 
are calculated by subtracting costs from gross sales. The Census of Manufacturing 
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Industries (CMI) data for 1985/86 and 1986/87 are used to calculate the price-cost 
margins as: 
j j j j
j
j





where jQ  is the value of output excluding indirect taxes. jEC  denotes employment cost which 
includes wage and salaries. jIC  refers to intermediate cost. This is composed of cost on raw 
material and fuel and electricity. jNIC  depicts non-industrial cost, which consists of 
depreciation, rent, interest, advertisement and other overhead costs” (Khondker, 1996). The 
above formula shows how the profitability is supposed to rise with the quantity and the own-
price of the output, and to decrease with any cost induced by the production of the output. Thus 
if the boom effect (through the resource movement and the spending effects) affects only one 
of the variables in the profitability formula, it would be straightforward to determine whether 
the shock resulted in the rise or decrease of the profitability. However, mostly the resource 
movement effect and the spending effect affect more than one variable of the profitability 
formula. Consequently, the move of the profitability will depends on the variable that weighs 
more. More precisely the profitability will go down if the spending and resource movement 
effects lead to heavier costs than the turnover and vice-versa. 
 
APPENDIX 4: Trend-based budgeting. 
 
“When business conditions are changing, developing a budget that anticipates 
where the trend is going is wise and appropriate. The skilled manager or budget 
analyst must review historical data, draw conclusions based on those facts and 
balance that knowledge with current market conditions and what she believes will 
happen in the future. The results of this analysis will be presented as the new, trend 
based budget”; (Bigelow). 
 
APPENDIX 5: Intergeneration Equity Model by Hartwick. 
(Hartwick, 1977, ss. 972-973) 
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Hartwick prescribes how an exhaustible resource can equitably be shared between 
the present generation and the future generation. According to the Hartwick, 
intergenerational equity translates into the investment of the revenues from the 
exhaustible resource in productive capital such “machines” (that would not 
depreciate) so as to maintain the GDP per capita constant throughout the subsequent 
generations. Thus when considering the case of a “one-commodity world”, this is 
achieved when “the rate of change in the marginal product of the” exhaustible 
resource equals “the marginal product of reproducible capital”. The revenues of the 
Norwegian oil is kept in the Government Pension Fund Global (a sovereign fund), 
which is not directly a real capital (like machines) even though it is a reproducible 
capital (i.e., a financial capital). As such, the growing Norwegian oil-rent does 
somehow comply to Hartwick intergenerational equity model. The non-renewable 
resource that represent the Norwegian oil has via the Government Pension Fund 
Global been turned into a renewable (financial) resource. The creation of this latter 
renewable (financial) resource has permitted the Norwegian representatives to skirt 
the application of intergenerational equity since the renewable capital are abroad 
not in Norway. Therefore, the intergenerational equity associated to the Norwegian 











APPENDIX 6: Flåten’s criticism on the valuation of Natural 
capital contribution to national income. 
 
I. Appendix 6.1. Computation of the human capital by the Norwegian SSB method 
Depreciation Labor Costs
Economic Rent of Natural Capital GrossProduct Net Subsidies
Normal Retrun To Real Capital
Depreciation Labor Costs
Economic Rent of Produced Real Capital GrossProduct
 
 
   
  

  Net Subsidies
Normal Retrun To Real Capital
Labor Costs
Economic Rent of Financial GrossProduct Net Subsidies







   
  
Economic Rent of Natural Capital
Human Capital National Income Economic Rent of Produced Real Capital
Economic Rent of Financial
 
 
   
  
 
II. Appendix 6.2. The Danish computation method of human capital. 
The economic council (2012) resorts to two methods for the computation of human 
capital, namely the costs method (called method A) and the income method (called 
method B): 
The first, method A, is the costs method, and it computes the cost society bears to 
constitute the human capital. This cost includes public and part of private expenses 
devoted to teaching, as well as the opportunity cost of studying. Studying while 
working is not taken into account as it is difficult to quantify. In that method, human 
capital depreciates over 67 years, which is the expected remaining lifetime for a 16 
year old person. The value of the lost earnings is based on the number of people 
older than 16 years who are either studying or working (for the unskilled labor). 
This method, which treats human capital as real capital, enables to show that human 
capital went from 2.7 times the GDP in 1990 to 3.8 times in 2010.  
The second Danish method, method B, is the income method and is also based on 
population education. Besides, this method considers the expected return to 
education as more education yields higher wage. Applied to Danish data, it came 
out as a return of 4.3% of more education, which means that one additional year of 
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education over the average time of education increases human capital by 4.3%. 
With this method, human capital has been estimated to 12.5 times the GDP. Flåten 
got almost the same figure when he replicates this B method. 
III. Appendix 6.3. Flåten replication of the Danish computation method of human capital. 
As it becomes obvious in the preceding paragraphs, the magnitude of figures found 
when using the Danish A method differs substantially from those obtained from 
implementing method B. For this reason, Flåten has replicated the two methods. As 
for the data, he notices that resorting to 2010 data or 2011 data does not make 
significant differences. The following table summarizes Flåten’s findings; the most 
striking point is that human capital is certainly the type of capital that contributes 
the most to the national income but far less than the statement from the Norwegian 
Finance Department (“Perspektivemelding”). 
Table 9. The two alternative calculations of human capital and natural capital contribution to national 
product. 
 The Norwegian evaluation methods The Danish evaluation methods replicated by Flåten. 





Human Capital 81% of 2010’s national income. 71% of 2011’s national income. 37.3% 66.2% 
Natural Capital 4% of 2010’s national income. 11% of 2011’s national income. 25.6% 13.8% 
Real capital   27.7% 14.9% 
Financial Capital   9.4% 5.1% 
National wealth   25 409 318 (100%) 47 126 067 (100%) 
 










APPENDIX 7: Sidgwick quotes on GHE. 
 
“Sidgwick’s own solution was different. It was, in effect, to justify double 
standards- one for exceptional, another for ordinary people […] Thus, on Utilitarian 
principles, it may be right to da and privately recommend, under certain 
circumstances, what it would not be right t advocate openly; it may be right to teach 
openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be 
conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would 
be wrong to do in face of the world… These conclusions are all of a paradoxical 
character; there is no doubt that the moral consciousness of a plain man broadly 
repudiates the general notion of an esoteric morality, differing from what is 
popularly taught; and it would be commonly agreed that an action which would be 
bad if done openly is not rendered good by secrecy. We may observe, however, that 
there are strong utilitarian reasons for maintaining this latter common opinion… 
Thus Utilitarian conclusions, carefully stated, would seem to be this: that the 
opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so 
should itself be kept comparatively secret; and similarly it seems expedient that the 
doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric. […] 
“Government House Utilitarianism””; (Skidelsky, 1994, ss. 36-37). 
This idea of “paternalistic duplicity […] was not invented by Sidgwick. In Plato’s 
Republic, Socrates” defends the idea of “noble lie”; (Katarzyna & Singer, 2010, s. 
36). 
 
APPENDIX 8: Calabresi & Bobbitt quotes on tragic choices. 
 
“We cannot know why the world suffers. But we can know how the world decides 
that suffering shall come to some persons and not to others. While the world permits 
the sufferers to be chosen, something beyond their agony is earned, something even 
beyond the satisfaction of the world’s needs and desires. For it is in the choosing 
that enduring societies preserve or destroy those values that suffering and necessity 
expose. In this way societies are defined, for it is by the values that are foregone no 




“[…] the tragedies of cultures; it is the values accepted by a society as fundamental 
that mark some choices as tragic”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 17). 
“They must attempt to make allocations in ways that preserve the moral foundations 
of social collaboration”; 
“But unless the values held in tension have changed, the illusion that denies their 
conflict gives way and the transformation will have only been a postponement”; 
“Action in the context of necessary scarcity brings ultimate values, the values by 
which a society defines itself, into conflict”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 18). 
“The paradoxical fact that societies often refuse to permit the production of the full 
amount of the scarce resource that could be made available without creating other 
unacceptable scarcities”; 
“We often move in what appear to be erratic jumps, valuing life at a rather low level 
in some circumstances at the first order and at a high level in other situations”; 
“By making the result seem necessary, unavoidable, rather than chosen, it attempts 
to convert what is tragically chosen into what is merely a fatal misfortune. But 
usually this will be no more than a subterfuge ”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 21). 
“Scarcity in general remains a fact oflife, but in the particular tragic situation, 
scarcity and suffering are not merely imposed: the society incurs them by its own 
decision or, at the least […] it is then we observe most dramatically […] the 
progression  from decision to rationalize to violence which in succeeding cycles 
characterizes the development of the tragic choice, the flight which evidences the 
attempt to transform atragic dilemma into a situation in which the conflictof values 
is not exposed and which the society will not find tragic ”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 
1978, s. 22). 
“Whether the decision is perceived as tragic […] is a function of what methods are 
used to cope with the fatal scarcity”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 23). 
“But the trick of dishonesty depends on assumptions on honesty; when these are 
questioned, honesty serves as a powerful engine of attack on the allocation”; 
(Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 24). 
“Honesty is not merely the backdrop against which tragic decisions are made, 
though it is surely this, as one quickly sees when it is doubted”. 
“Though subterfuge may bring us peace, for a while, it is honesty which causes the 
tragic choice to reappear. It is honesty which must be protected from those 
allocation methods which taint it, while using its legitimating prestige to deal with 
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immediate problems, because if altered, honesty loses its analytical power to deal 
with future problems quite unlike the ones we presently face and flatter ourselves 
that we understand”; (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 1978, s. 26). 
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